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LAWYER INDEPENDENCE: FROM IDEAL
TO VIABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Kevin H. Michels†
ABSTRACT
When, if ever, does a lawyer have an obligation to exercise
independent judgment? While the question drives at the deepest
commitments of the profession, it has been left largely unexplored in
our leading treatises on legal ethics and lawyering. Lawyers,
scholars, and judges have waxed eloquent on the ideal of
independence, and have despaired of its prospects of renewal in a
competitive, market-driven profession. The courts, however, have
offered limited guidance on the question of lawyer independence.
Indeed, the impression that one might gain from a review of the case
law and treatises is that lawyer independence—whatever its virtues—
is more a lost ideal than a legal requirement.
In fact, however, Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (adopted by nearly every state) requires that lawyers
―exercise independent professional judgment‖ in ―representing a
client.‖ This demand raises a host of questions about the lawyer’s
role. What is lawyer independence? If lawyers are ―agents‖ who seek
to carry out client objectives, how can lawyer independence be
squared with the notion of the client as decisionmaker and principal?
Is lawyer independence enforceable, or does the paucity of cases
construing the requirement suggest that it can never be more than an
aspiration? Can we frame a standard that is sufficiently precise for
lawyers to understand when they may not defer to client directives?

† Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, The College of New Jersey. The author
wishes to thank Kathryn Hockenjos, John Leubsdorf, Brandon Paradise and Andrew Rothman
for their excellent comments on drafts of this article.
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This Article seeks to answer those questions. In so doing, it seeks
to develop a viable legal standard of lawyer independence grounded
in Model Rule 2.1. The Article considers the purpose of lawyer
independence, when it applies and when it does not, and what it
requires of counsel. It contends that the law of lawyer independence,
once understood, will require attorneys to revisit core assumptions
about their role and will substantially reduce the incidence of
wrongdoing in corporate transactions. The Article invites states to
breathe life into a rule that has lain dormant on their books for too
long.
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 86
II. AGENCY: T HE ATMOSPHERE OF ASSUMPTIONS ..................... 92
III. DEPARTING FROM AGENCY: WHY AND WHEN ...................... 96
A. Introduction ..................................................................... 96
B. Why Lawyer Independence? ............................................. 97
C. When Must the Lawyer Be Independent? ........................ 102
1. Eliminating Advocacy ................................................ 102
2. Nonadvocacy Assistance ............................................ 105
D. Agency and Independence Reconciled ........................... 108
IV. WHAT DOES INDEPENDENCE REQUIRE? .............................. 111
A. Introduction ................................................................... 111
B. Advice ........................................................................... 111
1. Independence ............................................................. 112
2. Professional Judgment ............................................... 115
3. Candor ...................................................................... 119
C. Transactions .................................................................. 120
V. AN INVITATION TO THE STATES .......................................... 124
A. Introduction ................................................................... 124
B. The Opportunity for Reform ........................................... 125
C. Attorney Discipline ........................................................ 128
D. Attorney Liability .......................................................... 130
E. Relation to Other Standards ........................................... 134
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 136
I. INTRODUCTION
When, if ever, does a lawyer have an obligation to exercise
independent judgment? While the question drives at the deepest
commitments of the profession, it has been left largely unexplored in
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our leading treatises on legal ethics and lawyering.1 Lawyers, judges,
and scholars have waxed eloquent on the ideal of independence and
have despaired of its prospects of renewal in a competitive, marketdriven profession.2 The courts, however, have offered limited
guidance on the question of lawyer independence.3 Indeed, the
impression that one might gain from a review of the case law and
treatises is that lawyer independence—whatever its virtues—is more
a lost ideal than a legal requirement.
In fact, however, Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (―Model Rules‖), adopted in nearly in every state,4 requires a
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000) (offering
no discussion of lawyer independence); ABA/BNA LAWYERS‘ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 31:701 to :708 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter LAWYERS‘ MANUAL] (providing limited
treatment of lawyer independence); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING § 23.2 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2005-2) (offering a two-paragraph account of
rule requiring independent professional judgment).
2 The seminal statement is from Louis Brandeis, who lamented the loss of lawyer
―independence‖ and contended that ―[t]he leading lawyers of the United States have been
engaged mainly in supporting the claims of the corporations; often in endeavoring to evade or
nullify the extremely crude laws by which legislators sought to regulate the power or curb the
excesses of corporations.‖ LOUIS D. B RANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in B USINESS—A
PROFESSION 313, 322 (1914). Harold Williams, former Chairman of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, offered a similar critique, arguing that ―[t]o correct this tendency, the
bar must place greater emphasis on the lawyer‘s role as an independent professional—
particularly, on his responsibility to uphold the integrity of his profession.‖ Harold M. Williams,
Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36 Bus. Law. 159, 165–66 (1980). Quoting speeches of
Brandeis, Chief Justice Stone, and others, Robert Gordon observes, ―In these speeches—and
hundreds more like them—we hear one of the great epic themes of professional rhetoric: the
praise of independence, the fear of its decline. Though lawyers may disagree about what such
independence entails and what threatens it, there is a remarkable consistency in the substance
and tone of their words.‖ Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1,
5–6 (1988). Scholars continue to voice concerns about the importance of the loss of lawyer
independence. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s
Duty of Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2004) (asking whether ―competitive
pressures of the last forty years have indeed forced the ideal of lawyer professional
independence to the deep, almost unseen, background‖); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the
Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 173 (2002)
(―[T]he professional ideal of ‗independent professional judgment‘ does not inform the behavior
of some lawyers who represent large corporations in major transactions and high-stakes
litigation.‖); Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 MD.
L. REV. 217, 219 (2002) (discussing scholars‘ concerns about the decline of professionalism and
lawyer independence).
3 See infra notes 61–75 and accompanying text.
4 The American Bar Association promulgated the Model Rules in 1983, and it has
amended them frequently since, including substantial revisions in 2002, based on the
recommendations of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(―Ethics 2000 Commission‖), chaired by Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey. CTR. FOR PROF‘L
RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS‘N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at
iii (6th ed. 2007). The Model Rules are the subject of our discussion because of their widespread
adoption by the states. Forty-nine states have adopted some version of the Model Rules, often
with amendments. See LAWYERS‘ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 01:11 to :82 (July 27, 2005)
(summarizing how the ethics rules adopted in each state differ from the Model Rules). California
is also considering adoption of the Model Rules. See Commission for the Revision of the Rules of
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lawyer to exercise ―independent professional judgment‖ and provide
―candid advice‖ in ―representing a client‖5—demands that I will refer
to collectively as ―lawyer independence.‖6 The Rule raises a host of
questions about the lawyer‘s role. What is lawyer independence?
Could a demand for lawyer independence, once fully understood and
implemented in practice, change our understanding of the attorney‘s
role? Is lawyer independence enforceable or does the paucity of cases
construing the requirement suggest that it can never be more than an
aspiration?7 If lawyers are ―agents‖ who seek to carry out client
objectives, how can we square a demand of lawyer independence with
the notion of the client as decisionmaker and principal?
The stakes are high. Consider the lawyer‘s obligations in the
following scenarios:
 The client consults the lawyer about consummating a
transaction, but provides little business background on the nature and
purpose of the transaction and discourages the attorney from learning
more, while insisting that the attorney ―document‖ the deal.
 The attorney suspects that the client‘s proposed transaction is
fraudulent or criminal, but without more information has no way of
knowing whether, in fact, it is. The client directs the attorney to
consummate the transaction without inquiring into its propriety.

Professional Conduct, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Committees/
RulesCommission.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). For a review of the few state variations on
Rule 2.1, see infra note 216.
5 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) (―In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.‖). The second
sentence of the Rule permits a lawyer to discuss moral and other considerations with the client
as well, a question considered extensively in the legal literature. See, e.g., Larry O. Natt Gantt,
II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal
Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 367 (2005) (tracing the history and offering an
interpretation of the nonlegal-considerations rule); Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal
Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 41–48 (1997) (exploring
the tension between personal and professional values in advising clients). Our concern in this
Article, however, is the mandatory first sentence of the Rule. The first sentence, though largely
overlooked by courts to date, may rank among the most important of our ethics rules because it
offers a direct challenge to the agency conception of lawyering that dominates our
understanding of the profession. The terms ―Model Rule 2.1‖ and ―Rule,‖ as used herein, refer
only to the first sentence of Model Rule 2.1, unless otherwise stated.
6 This Article considers lawyer independence from clients as distinct from the state. For
an interesting discussion of a system that emphasizes lawyer independence from both the state
and clients, see JOHN LEUBSDORF, MAN IN HIS ORIGINAL DIGNITY: LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE
1–28 (2001).
7 See William H. Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic Professional
Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1555, 1596 (2008) (concluding that
bad legal advice undermines enforcement and vindication of the law, but leaving open ―the
question of whether formal, coercive enforcement would be desirable‖).
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 The client wants to engage in an action and asks the lawyer
whether it is lawful. The lawyer sets out to find a way to characterize
the behavior as lawful in order to help the client proceed as he wishes,
perhaps with minor changes in the proposed behavior to make it at
least ―arguably‖ satisfactory.
 The client wishes to undertake a transaction that violates the law.
He asks the lawyer to find a way to structure the transaction to satisfy
the literal dictates of the law at the expense of what the lawyer
concludes are the law‘s real objectives.
While it may not be immediately apparent, each of these scenarios
raises questions of lawyer independence. Each asks, ultimately,
whether the attorney is best understood as an agent of the client, or
whether her role transcends agency. The first of these examples
implicates questions about the deliberative role of the attorney. Can
she accept a circumscribed, limited role if the client insists, or does
some obligation or larger interest demand a deeper involvement,
despite the client‘s contrary directive? The second example is
complicated by the fact that the lawyer does not know that the
proposed transaction constitutes a crime or fraud. Does independence
require the attorney to inquire more deeply into the facts to determine
whether the transaction poses problems? In the third example, can the
lawyer allow the client‘s objectives to shade her assessment of what
the law requires? In the fourth example, must the attorney press her
concerns on the client, or is the client‘s interest in facilitating the
transaction and its ―literal‖ compliance reason enough for the lawyer
to push forward with the deal?
As the examples above make clear, questions of lawyer
independence arise regularly in legal practice, especially in the
counseling and transactional settings. They pose delicate questions
regarding the balance of power in the attorney-client relationship.
These questions have simmered just below the surface of the scandals
that have erupted over the last few decades. The refrain ―Where were
the lawyers?‖ has echoed through every major business scandal from
the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s through the corporate
scandals in the 2000s.8 In many of these cases, the lawyers did not ask
questions about transactions that appeared suspicious.9 The Model
8 See, e.g., Report of the New York City Bar Association Task Force on the Lawyer‘s
Role in Corporate Governance—November 2006, 62 BUS. LAW. 427, 440 (2007) [hereinafter
New York City Bar Report] (explaining that these scandals led to federal obligations on lawyers
to report evidence of corporate wrongdoing up the corporate ladder).
9 See, e.g., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM., BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION 17 (2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102
rpt1.pdf (citing the absence of ―objective and critical professional advice by outside counsel‖);
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Rules appear to encourage willful blindness by prohibiting a lawyer
from furthering a transaction only when she knows that the
transaction is wrongful.10 The knowledge standard seeks only to
prohibit attorney complicity in a client‘s crime or fraud—an
obligation as obvious as it is insufficient to counter client
wrongdoing. The critical, unanswered question is whether attorneys
have an obligation to acquire knowledge before acting, a question
that until now has not been examined through the lens of lawyer
independence.
Questions about lawyer independence lie at the center of the recent
controversy over the role of Justice Department attorneys in advising
the Bush Administration on whether certain interrogation methods
violated international prohibitions on torture.11 The questions may
appear superficially distinct from the counseling and transactional
questions described above, but they trace their origins to the same
source—lawyer independence. If, as some have argued, the advice
contained in the Justice Department memoranda was biased,12 may
lawyers proceed under a ―partisan‖ view of legal counseling, in which
their legal interpretations and advice are influenced by the client‘s
objectives? If not, how can lawyers serve their clients—who, after all,
retain and compensate them to fulfill client objectives? As the earlier
examples suggest, these issues arise not only or even principally in
the government setting. Our purpose here is not to assess the role of
lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel scandals, but to look to the

Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Caught in the Middle, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2007, at 84, 84 (―In this
decade‘s first great wave of scandals, beginning with Enron Corp. and centering on fraudulent
financial practices, the question was, ‗Where were the lawyers?‘ In-house counsel were either
excluded from key decisions, or they failed to ask aggressive questions about whether
problematic actions were legal or appropriate.‖); New York City Bar Report, supra note 8, at
431–32 (―[L]awyers, either in-house or outside, appear to have been strategically positioned
with respect to a significant number of these scandals. . . . Where questions were not asked or
pressed, it is reasonable to believe that more assertive action might have avoided or mitigated
wrongdoing in some of these situations.‖); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking
the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457
(2006) (―There is no indication that these professionals ever asked the question, ‗Is this
misleading?‘‖).
10 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (prohibiting lawyers from assisting a
client ―in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent‖).
11 See, e.g., Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of
Justice, to the Att‘y Gen. & the Deputy Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice 68 (Jan. 5, 2010),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf [hereinafter
Margolis Memorandum] (finding that memoranda were flawed and the result of poor judgment
but that these deficiencies did not rise to the level of professional misconduct).
12 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 175, 179
(2006) (arguing that the authors twisted international law in their memoranda); Kathleen Clark,
Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT‘L SEC. L. & POL‘Y 455, 462,
463 (2005) (describing the legal analysis in the Bybee memorandum as ―indefensible‖).
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foundational questions posed by lawyer independence in the lawyerclient relationship.
In short, this Article seeks to develop a viable theory and legal
standard of lawyer independence grounded in Rule 2.1. While this
Rule has been in effect in the overwhelming majority of states for
nearly a quarter of a century,13 its impact on the courts and bar has
been negligible. While a number of reasons explain the courts‘
neglect of this Rule,14 one critical barrier to its application is the
absence of a viable account of lawyer independence—its underlying
rationale; when it applies; what it requires of counsel; how it relates
to the traditional role of lawyers as agents of clients; and how courts,
disciplinary authorities, practitioners, and civil claimants might apply
the Rule. This Article seeks to provide such an account.
Part II sets the stage for the inquiry into independence by
sketching the nature of the attorney-client relationship as it is
currently conceived—with a minimal commitment to lawyer
independence. It argues that the current conception of lawyering is
grounded on a principal-agent model that emphasizes client control.
Part III begins by considering the tension between the agency
conception of lawyering and the call for lawyer independence set
forth in Rule 2.1. It next asks why Rule 2.1 insists on lawyer
independence in a profession otherwise committed to furthering client
objectives, drawing on the work of David Luban.15 Part III then
attempts to determine with some precision when lawyer independence
is required—a critical question if lawyer independence is not to
undermine client prerogatives categorically. Finally, Part III seeks to
reconcile our commitments to agency and independence.
Part IV leverages the insights developed in Part III into an account
of what lawyer independence requires of counsel. It explores the
meaning, categories, and challenges of independence, and the
procedural and substantive elements of professional judgment. It
argues that lawyer independence imposes critical, and heretofore
unacknowledged, demands on counsel in the situation that is often at
the heart of the scandals of recent decades—when attorneys have
reason to suspect that a transaction is wrongful, even though such
suspicion does not amount to knowledge.
13 By the summer of 1987, the majority of states had adopted the Model Rules with
variations. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.15. Currently, forty-nine states have
adopted Rule 2.1, and all but one have adopted the first sentence of the Rule without varying the
ABA‘s proposed language. See infra note 216.
14 See infra Part V.A.
15 DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 153–57 (2007), discussed infra at
notes 76, 80 and accompanying text.
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Part V invites the states to reconsider the long-overlooked law of
lawyer independence in both the disciplinary and liability settings. It
also explains how the proposed standards will close a troubling gap in
our interpretation of the Model Rules. Finally, it describes how and
why lawyer independence differs from the law traditionally invoked
when questions of client fraud arise—section 307 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 200216 and Model Rule 1.13.17 If states are troubled by
the corporate scandals of recent decades and by the passivity of
lawyers who counseled these corporations and furthered their
transactions, the tools of reform are well within reach. States already
insist on lawyer independence in name; it is time to insist on lawyer
independence in practice.
Part VI concludes with a summary of our account of lawyer
independence and its significance for courts and practitioners.
II. AGENCY: THE ATMOSPHERE OF ASSUMPTIONS
Because lawyer independence has received scant attention in our
treatises18 and case law,19 we must begin by sketching the central
elements of the attorney-client relationship in its absence. The reading
hardly seems controversial at first. In fact, the description that
follows, which we term the agency or client-autonomy vision of
lawyering, can be understood as the modern conception of the
practice of law.20 While the elements of the agency vision described
here are not false, Part III will contend that they are dangerously
incomplete. As we shall see, the challenge is to integrate an
understanding of lawyer independence into a view that is deeply
ingrained in our understanding of the profession.
A principal-agent relationship exists when one person agrees to
―act on the principal‘s behalf and subject to the principal‘s control.‖21
Consistent with this precept, the Model Rules provide, with certain
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (setting forth professional responsibility rules for attorneys).
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2009) (providing rules for the lawyer
whose client is an organization).
18 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
19 See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
20 See Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 693, 717–18 (2006) (―[T]he lawyer‘s role as the client‘s agent is more than a mere legal
obligation. It is also fully incorporated in the narrative of the profession. Taught in the law
schools of the nation, both consciously and unconsciously, and embraced in frequent public
tributes to the legal profession, the notion of loyalty to and zeal on behalf of clients forms the
dominant filter through which lawyers view their work.‖) (footnotes omitted)); see also DAVID
A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 18 (1991)
(emphasizing the client‘s self-determination, ―autonomy, intelligence, dignity, and basic
morality‖).
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
16
17
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exceptions, that the ―lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decisions
concerning the objectives of representation.‖22 Principal control is a
central precept of agency law,23 and within limits that we shall
describe, it is a core precept of the agency conception of lawyering.24
Most of the duties that lawyers owe to clients are mirrored in
agency law generally. Lawyers must further the client‘s matter with
diligence, promptness25 and competence;26 duties that are imposed on
all agents.27 The lawyer must keep the client informed about the
matter and provide sufficient explanation for the client to make
informed decisions about the matter.28 Again, agency law imposes a
similar duty of communication.29 Consistent with agency law, lawyers
are liable to their clients for failure to perform their services
reasonably.30 The attorney-client relationship is likewise suffused
with fiduciary duties, which derive from the responsibility and trust
afforded to the attorney.31 The attorney‘s fiduciary duty of loyalty is
reflected in the elaborate regulations on conflicts of interest,32
protection of client funds,33 and prohibitions on using information to
harm the client.34 Agency law imposes fiduciary duties as well,35
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (requiring agent to comply with
principal‘s lawful instructions).
24 See id. § 1.01 cmt. c (noting that elements of common-law agency are present in the
lawyer-client relationship).
25 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3.
26 Id. R. 1.1.
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (requiring that an agent act with care,
competence, and diligence).
28 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (requiring the agent to provide facts to
the principal if the principal so wishes or if they are material to the agent‘s duties and they can
be provided without the agent violating a superior duty to another person).
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (imposing liability on agent for breach
of the duty of care); 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.13
(2009 ed. 2009) (describing the elements of negligence claim against counsel and collecting
case law across jurisdictions).
31 See, e.g., In re Hayes, 183 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (―[T]he attorney-client
relationship entails one of the highest fiduciary duties imposed by law.‖); In re Cooperman, 633
N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) (―This unique fiduciary reliance . . . is imbued with ultimate
trust and confidence.‖); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (noting that
trust is the ―hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship‖); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000) (―A lawyer is a fiduciary . . . .‖).
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (providing regulations on lawyers and their
representation of current clients).
33 E.g., id. R. 1.15(a) (providing that a lawyer must keep the funds that he is holding for a
client separate from her own).
34 Id. R. 1.8(b) (stating that unless informed consent is given by a client, or permitted or
required elsewhere by the Model Rules, a lawyer may not use information relating to
representation to the client‘s disadvantage).
35 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (requiring agent loyalty to the
principal).
22
23
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requiring protection of the principal‘s property,36 prohibiting agent
conflicts of interests,37 and disallowing wrongful exploitation of the
principal‘s information.38
In some instances, the law of lawyering imposes additional
obligations on the lawyer beyond the general constructs of agency
law. For example, the lawyer is required, with certain exceptions, to
maintain in confidence information she learns from the client.39 While
agency law imposes an obligation to protect the confidential
information of the principal,40 the attorney‘s obligation is broader to
satisfy demands unique to the legal setting.41 Even the limited
exceptions to the attorney-confidentiality rule—allowing, for
example, an attorney to disclose confidential information to prevent
the client from harming a third party42—are narrowly drawn. Under
the Model Rules and in the overwhelming majority of states, the
exception stops short of requiring disclosure to prevent client
wrongdoing,43 despite compelling arguments that the personal safety
of others should trump the confidentiality rights of clients. Those who
opposed expansion of the disclosure exceptions have cited client
loyalty—a precept of agency44—as a reason for limiting the
exception.45
36 Id. § 8.12 (charging the agent with a duty to ensure the principal‘s property does not
appear to be the agent‘s, a duty to ensure the principal‘s property is not mingled with that of
others, and to perform an accounting of the principal‘s property).
37 Id. § 8.04 (providing that the agent cannot compete with the principal or assist the
principal‘s competitors).
38 Id. § 8.05 (noting that an agent must not use the principal‘s property for himself or a
third party and cannot communicate the principal‘s confidential information for his own benefit
or the benefit of a third party without the principal‘s consent).
39 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2).
41 See infra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale behind attorney
confidentiality provisions).
42 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (listing the six exceptions to the
attorney confidentiality rule, one of which allows a lawyer to reveal confidential information to
the extent she reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm).
43 See id. (stating that an attorney may reveal confidential information in one of six
situations). A small minority of states require an attorney to disclose information to prevent a
client from committing a criminal act likely to result in death or bodily harm to another,
although these remain the exception to the majority rule. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2010), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB
_2010.pdf; ILL. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2010), available at http://www.state.il.us/
court/supremecourt/rules/art_viii/ArtVIII_NEW.htm#1.6; N.J. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b) (1998), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rpc97.htm#1.6; WIS. SUP. CT. R.
20:1.6(b) (2010), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/scrule/DisplayDocument.html?
content=html&seqNo=45322#Confidentiality.
44 See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 4, at 13–14 (3d
ed. 2001) (discussing nature of the duty of loyalty under agency law).
45 See, e.g., LEGAL ETHICS COMM., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON DUTIES
OF CONFIDENTIALITY 18 (2001), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section
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One might argue that certain restrictions imposed on attorney
behavior render it unfair to characterize the modern conception of
lawyering as essentially an agency role. For example, lawyers cannot
knowingly further a client crime or fraud46 or knowingly deceive a
court or a third party.47 Again, however, each of these limitations has
analogues in the general conception of agency. Agents are not given
license by dint of their agency role to commit wrongful acts.48 Thus,
lawyers‘ obligations to courts and third parties are best understood
not as departures from the core commitments of agency, but as limits
that are imposed on all agents (including the principal) not to behave
wrongfully.
Even the so-called ―gatekeeping‖ reforms to the law of lawyering,
including Sarbanes-Oxley,49 are narrowly framed not to intrude
unduly on the loyalty that grounds the agency conception of
lawyering. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, an attorney who discovers
evidence of the company‘s ―material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation‖ must report it to the
company‘s chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer and,
failing an adequate response, to an audit or independent committee of
the board of directors or the entire board.50 Thus, the attorney reports
the wrongdoing to the client, not the government. And if the reporting
attorney fails to receive an ―appropriate response,‖ he must report
higher within the client organization.51
The Model Rules likewise require an attorney to report to a higherup within an organization when an officer of a corporation engages or
is about to engage in wrongful conduct.52 Interestingly, the Model
Rules allow counsel to disclose the information beyond the

=All_Publications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=69.
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).
47 Id. R. 3.3 (court); id. R. 4.1 (third parties).
48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 cmt. c (2006) (―[A]n agent has no duty
to comply with a directive to commit a crime or an act the agent has reason to know will be
tortious.‖).
49 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
50 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.2(e) (2010) (defining ―evidence of material violation‖).
51 If the attorney does not believe that the response is appropriate, the attorney must then
report the material violation to the audit committee of the board of directors, to a committee of
independent directors, or to the entire board of directors. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3). The
attorney is permitted to, but need not, report beyond the corporation in certain instances. See
generally William H. Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Role of Attorneys Under Sarbanes–Oxley: The
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee as Facilitator of Corporate Integrity, 43 AM. BUS. L.J.
439, 443 (2006) (devising a structure and procedure for monitoring corporations).
52 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).
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corporation only if an actor is about to engage in activity that will
harm the client.53 Thus, the organization-disclosure provisions of the
Model Rules pose no challenge to the agency vision of lawyering;
they allow disclosure beyond the organization only in furtherance of
client loyalty.
In sum, an agency or client-autonomy vision characterizes much of
the law governing lawyers. The client controls the goals of the
representation, and the attorney owes duties of loyalty and care in
fulfilling those goals. The constraints on lawyer behavior are likewise
generally consistent with agency principles, and prevent the attorney
from doing what the principal could not do on her own behalf. Even
those rules that appear to challenge the agency conception, such as
those allowing disclosure to prevent client wrongdoing and the
―reporting up‖ provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and Rule 1.13, are
narrowly framed so as not to undermine the loyalty element that
grounds the agency conception.
Into this symphony of provisions establishing a principal-agent
relationship, however, the Model Rules inject the seemingly dissonant
requirement of lawyer independence. Under Rule 2.1, the lawyer
must ―exercise independent professional judgment‖54 in representing
the client—a stark departure from agency law, which contains no
such requirement.55 Perhaps it is not surprising that lawyers, courts,
and commentators have yet to grasp the full significance of Rule 2.1,
given its curious presence amid the torrent of agency obligations.
Together, these agency principles form the ―atmosphere of
assumptions‖56 that are so embedded in the lawyer‘s selfunderstanding that they are rarely held up to the light of inspection.
We will do so next.
III. DEPARTING FROM AGENCY: WHY AND WHEN
A. Introduction
Model Rule 2.1 provides that ―[i]n representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice.‖57 In requiring that the lawyer reason independently of the
Id. R. 1.13(c).
Id. R. 2.1.
55 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006).
56 The phrase is from Franklin Burroughs, Compression Wood, 67 AM. SCHOLAR 123,
134 (1998). In this masterful essay, Burroughs contends that regions take on an ―atmosphere of
assumptions‖—in their history, economics, families, language and so on—that ―gradually
becomes invisible.‖ Id.
57 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
53
54
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client, this Rule heralds a fundamental departure from the agency
conception of lawyering described in Part II. The law of agency does
not require the agent to exercise ―independent‖ judgment—
professional or otherwise—and it does not require disclosure to the
principal of information that the agent does not wish to receive.58
Under agency principles, the principal may ―manifest a lack of
interest in receiving some or all information from the agent‖ and bear
the risk that her decision will be worse for such lack of interest.59
Rule 2.1, by contrast, requires the attorney to provide information that
the client is, in the language of the official comment, ―disinclined to
confront.‖60
Why does Model Rule 2.1 require the independent judgment of
counsel and the provision of information to the client over the client‘s
protestations when agency law requires neither? The reasons for
requiring independence of counsel are hardly self-evident, especially
for those who subscribe to the agency view of lawyering described in
Part II. A client on the agency view hires a lawyer, pays for legal
service, and presumably has a right to direct the representation as she
wishes. This tension with agency lies at the core of our inquiry in this
Part. We will ask why our ethics rules depart from agency law to
insist on independence and when counsel may no longer serve strictly
as an agent, and instead must exercise such independence. The
answers to each of these questions will set the stage for our inquiry in
Part IV into what lawyer independence requires of counsel.
B. Why Lawyer Independence?
What is the purpose of the lawyer-independence requirement set
forth in Rule 2.1? A review of the limited case law citing this Rule61
suggests that the courts are far from a clear, consistent understanding
of the Rule or its purpose. The cases that cite Model Rule 2.1 can be
grouped into four categories. First, a number of cases (often in the
bankruptcy setting) cite the Rule in support of the notion that an
attorney has an obligation to provide advice that will enable the client

58 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. b (―An agent owes the principal a
duty to provide information to the principal that the agent knows or has reason to know the
principal would wish to have.‖).
59 Id.
60 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
61 In total, the lawyer-independence language of Rule 2.1 has been cited in fewer than
forty reported decisions in the state and federal courts, often as dicta or as additional authority
rather than as the central theory in the case. For a discussion of why Rule 2.1 has to date been
largely ignored by courts and disciplinary authorities (and, by extension, lawyers), see infra
notes 218–21 and accompanying text.
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to make an informed decision.62 The second concerns conflicts of
interest, often based on the attorney‘s personal interest.63 The third
arises in attorney-disciplinary matters, disqualification motions, or
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims arising from the attorney‘s
sexual relationship with the client.64 The fourth category, which need
not divert us here, concerns allegations that the attorney has harmed
the client through a wrongful action—claims unrelated to Model Rule
2.1 and rejected accordingly.65
Let us consider the first interpretation–that Rule 2.1 is designed to
ensure that the client receives the best possible advice with respect to
her options before making a decision. The proposition alone is hardly
objectionable; it is, as discussed earlier, a staple of the agency
relationship.66 An agent owes a fiduciary duty to the principal, which
includes disclosure of information material to the principal.67 That
duty to disclose allows the principal to manage the agency
62 See, e.g., In re Count Liberty, LLC, 370 B.R. 259, 281–83 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007)
(―The attorney must render candid advice, so the client can make informed decisions regarding
the representation.‖ (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Engel, 246 B.R. 784,
792 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that lawyer cannot ―blithely allow a client to casually
complete or review the official schedules and statements without guidance as to the
consequences of such action‖); In re Pinkins, 213 B.R. 818, 822–23 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997)
(finding that attorneys who did not meet with their client until after the case was filed did not
adequately represent the client); In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 550–52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988) (―[A]n attorney is to facilitate informed decision-making by his client.‖).
63 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999) (noting that while
attorney may have personal interest in appealing a discovery sanction, the decision to appeal
should ―turn entirely on the client‘s interest‖); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728 n.14 (1986)
(noting that attorney rendered independent professional judgment when he recommended a
settlement and agreed to waive the statutory fee award and that he did not allow his own
interests to influence his professional advice); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424,
435 (1985) (noting that an attorney who is disqualified for misconduct may have ―a personal
interest‖ in an appeal, but that the ―decision to appeal should turn entirely on the client‘s
interest‖); In re Key, 582 S.E.2d 400, 402 (S.C. 2003) (disciplining attorney who represented
parties on both sides of the transaction).
64 See. e.g., Horaist v. Doctor‘s Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2001)
(denying motion to disqualify counsel due to conflict of interest arising from prior sexual
relationship with client); In re Ryland, 985 So. 2d 71, 75–76 (La. 2008) (disciplining attorney
for consensual sexual relations with client); In re DeFrancesch, 877 So. 2d 71, 77 (La. 2004)
(disciplining attorney for attempt to coerce client into sexual relations); In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d
859, 867 (La. 1998) (reasoning that attorney who engages in sexual relationship with a client
risks losing ―the objectivity and reasonableness that form the basis of the lawyer‘s independent
professional judgment‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass‘n v.
Groshon, 82 P.3d 99, 105–06 (Okla. 2003) (disciplining counsel for inappropriate sexual
advance to client); In re Halverson, 998 P.2d 833, 841 (Wash. 2000) (finding that attorney
violated Rule 2.1 by engaging in sexual relationship with client); State v. Stough, 980 P.2d 298,
301–02 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel because of sexual relationship with counsel).
65 See, e.g., Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 531 S.E.2d 282, 285–86 (S.C. 2000)
(rejecting cause of action against counsel for breach of express guarantee).
66 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (stating the general proposition
of agency law that an agent has a duty to act for the benefit of the principal).
67 Id. § 8.11.
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relationship and to make and revise decisions regarding how his agent
should proceed.68
While this rationale for lawyer independence has superficial
appeal, it does not square with a reading of the other Model Rules.
The lawyer is already expressly required by other provisions of the
Model Rules to provide competent representation69 and to provide the
client with all information needed to make an informed decision.70
The care that attended the drafting of the Model Rules makes
redundancy unlikely.71 Therefore, a reading of the Rule as nothing
more than a restatement of client-protection provisions set forth
elsewhere in the ethics rules appears invalid.72
The second and third categories described above can be combined
under one conceptual rubric: a lawyer‘s personal interests must not
color her advice or representation.73 That proposition, standing alone,
is beyond question, and it too is embraced by agency law.74 Again,
however, the Model Rules expressly regulate such conflicts of interest
elsewhere, prohibiting representation of clients when the personal
interests of the attorney would materially limit the attorney‘s effort.75
Thus, it appears that the independent-professional-judgment and
candor requirements of Rule 2.1 call for something other than a
restatement of the agency principles of competence, communication,
and loyalty described in Part II. These rationales seek to explain
lawyer independence from a principal-agency standpoint, when in
fact lawyer independence is a departure from it. If we are to identify
68 See id. § 8.11 cmt. b (stating that the agent‘s duty to provide information to the
principal allows the principal to exercise control in the agency relationship).
69 MODEL RULES OF P ROF ‘ L C ONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009).
70 Id. R. 1.4.
71 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.12 (discussing the multiple drafts and
widespread circulation, commentary, and revision that preceded ABA approval of the Model
Rules). See generally Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989) (providing an account of
the process that lead to the adoption of the Model Rules).
72 The comments to Model Rule 2.1 impliedly affirm this reading by noting that a duty to
inform the client of the adverse consequences ―to the client‖ may arise under Model Rule 1.4,
which requires communication with the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt.
5.
73 Occasionally, a court will cite Rule 2.1 to support a finding that the attorney‘s personal
interests (or the interests of other clients) conflict with the interests of the client. E.g., Scheffler
v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 950 So. 2d 641, 651 (La. 2007) (noting that Rule 2.1 requires an
attorney‘s ―undivided loyalty‖). As discussed in the text, Rule 2.1 is best understood as
addressing concerns other than loyalty.
74 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
75 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (prohibiting representation when
―there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially
limited by the lawyer‘s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a
personal interest of the lawyer‖); see also id. R. 1.8 (regulating specific conflicts of interest
between lawyer and client).
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the core interest served by Rule 2.1, we need to look beyond client
interests—the preoccupation of the agency conception of lawyering.
David Luban offers critical insight here. Rule 2.1, he argues,
places special importance on the lawyer‘s role in advising the client—
not to protect the client‘s interest in receiving competent advice or
sufficient information, but to increase the prospect that the client will
refrain from acting when the proposed behavior is wrongful.76
Suppose, for example, that a client seeks the advice of counsel about
whether the client‘s proposed action is legal. Model Rule 1.6 affords
confidentiality to client conversations with counsel77 because:
The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and
to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer
needs this information to represent the client effectively and,
if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful
conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers
in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex
of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct.
Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients
follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.78
Thus, Model Rules 2.1 and 1.6 must be read in tandem. A central
rationale for the confidentiality obligation of Model Rule 1.6 is to
enable lawyers to advise the client on the correct state of the law to
ensure that the client complies with the law.
The shield of confidentiality, of course, extracts a considerable
societal cost. Third parties who may have been the victim of client
wrongdoing lose an important source of information: the attorney
who learns incriminating information from the client.79 As Luban
76 LUBAN, supra note 15. Luban argues that ―if the lawyer doesn‘t tell the client that what
he plans is unlawful, in many instances nobody will.‖ Id. at 154. Luban borrows this argument
from Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958), who caution that, in the counselor role, the
attorney ―must be at pains to preserve a sufficient detachment from his client‘s interests so that
he remains capable of sound and objective appraisal of the propriety of what his client proposes
to do.‖
77 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (providing, with exceptions, that ―[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client‖). The
confidentiality obligations set forth in the Model Rules should not be confused with the
attorney-client privilege, typically codified in evidence rules, and applicable when the attorney
is called to testify. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501 (federal privilege rule).
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2; see also id. pmbl. para. 13
(―Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society.‖).
79 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers offers an illustration based on
the famous and troubling Lake Pleasant Bodies Case. See People v. Belge, 50 A.D.2d 1088
(N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff’d, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976), cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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notes, Model Rule 2.1 solves a puzzle that has long vexed ethics law:
how to justify confidentiality given this considerable societal cost.
Confidentiality ―is a good bet for society only because we can count
on lawyers to give good advice on compliance (and on clients to take
that advice). If the lawyer doesn‘t give independent, candid advice,
this entire argument, and indeed the whole edifice of confidentiality,
comes tumbling down.‖80
Model Rule 2.1, therefore, imposes conditions on counseling that
will enhance its accuracy: the lawyer‘s advice must be grounded on
independent professional judgment and must be relayed candidly to
the client.81 Without these elements, the advice is less likely to be
―legal and correct,‖82 the client is less likely to desist from his
wrongful plans, and the cost of confidentiality will have been
unjustified.83
Rule 2.1 does not specify the precise type of harm or ―wrongful
conduct‖84 that it seeks to prevent through independent professional
judgment. A narrow construction of the Rule would limit such
concerns to criminal wrongdoing, a troubling approach since clients
can perpetrate vast tortious harm on third parties, as the corporate
scandals of recent decades have made all too clear.85 A sweeping
construction of the terms ―wrongful conduct‖ might include any legal
wrongdoing, civil or criminal, that could be visited on society or a
third party through the client‘s wrongdoing. The latter view would
have an anomalous effect, however, of extending the reach of Model

LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 reporter‘s note (2000). A client admitted to killing two
people whose bodies had not yet been discovered. The lawyer was barred under the
confidentiality rules from disclosing the location of the bodies to the families of the likely
victims. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. b, illus. 1.
The Restatement notes that the cost of confidentiality includes ―persons whose personal plight
and character are much more sympathetic than those of the lawyer‘s client or who could
accomplish great public good or avoid great public detriment if the information were disclosed.‖
Id. § 60 cmt. b.
80 LUBAN, supra note 15, at 156 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
81 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
82 Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (noting that clients, ―[a]lmost without exception,‖ seek lawyers to
determine their rights, as well as what is ―legal and correct‖).
83 Inaccurate advice from counsel may also frustrate criminal prosecution or the
imposition of liability based on intentional or malicious conduct because an attorney‘s advice
that the conduct is proper may be admissible as evidence with respect to the client‘s mens rea.
See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
84 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2.
85 See, e.g., Mark Sherman, High Court Will Review Skilling Case: Appeal of Former
Enron Leader Imprisoned Ex-CEO Serving 24-Year Term, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at
A10, available at 2009 WLNR 26370000 (―[A]ccounting tricks and shady business deals . . . led
to the loss of thousands of jobs, more than $60 billion in Enron stock value and more than $2
billion in employee pension plans after the company imploded in 2001.‖) For an analysis of the
role of counsel in various Enron transactions, see generally Cramton, supra note 2.
THE
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Rule 2.1 beyond the ―criminal or fraudulent‖ client activities that
counsel is prohibited from knowingly assisting under Model Rule
1.2(d).86 Thus, we will confine our understanding of the ―wrongful
conduct‖ that Model Rule 2.1 seeks to prevent to ―criminal or
fraudulent,‖ with the further limitation that ―fraudulent‖ conduct have
a ―purpose to deceive.‖87
By demanding lawyer independence to protect the interests of
those other than the client, Rule 2.1 presents a stark departure from
the agency conception of lawyering. As a result, it is critical that we
understand when it applies. We turn to that question next.
C. When Must the Lawyer Be Independent?
Rule 2.1 is certainly not modest in its demands or reach, if its
literal terms are controlling: in representing the client, the lawyer
must ―exercise independent professional judgment‖ and provide
―candid advice.‖88 Whatever ―independent professional judgment‖
requires of counsel,89 it is clear that the demand poses a direct
challenge to the agency conception of the attorney-client
relationship.90 Thus, a critical threshold question is when must the
lawyer act with such independence.
1. Eliminating Advocacy
By its terms, Model Rule 2.1 must be satisfied ―in representing a
client.‖91 Thus, on a literal reading, it would appear that counsel must
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice
to the client in all phases of the attorney-client relationship—an
interpretation that threatens to overturn entirely the agency view of
lawyering. (We will term this interpretation the expansive view.) On
the other hand, the title of Rule 2.1, ―Advisor,‖92 suggests that the
Rule applies less expansively, i.e., when the attorney is advising or
counseling the client (the advisory view)—a view that poses
challenging interpretive questions of its own.
The evolution of Rule 2.1 suggests that the demand of independent
professional judgment does not extend to the lawyer‘s role as an
advocate.93 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (―Model
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).
Id. R. 1.0(d) (defining ―fraud‖ or ―fraudulent‖ to require ―a purpose to deceive‖).
Id. R. 2.1.
See infra Part IV.
See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
Id.
The candor requirement of Model Rule 2.1 would not attach to court-directed
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Code‖), which predated the Model Rules,94 declared that the
attorney‘s roles of ―advocate or advisor‖ are ―essentially different,‖
and that the advocate should resolve doubts about the law in favor of
the client.95 ―[I]n appropriate circumstances,‖ the advisor, by contrast,
―should give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate
decisions of the courts would likely be as to the applicable law.‖96
The Model Code‘s comments elaborated on the disjunction between
the advocate and advisor roles, noting that ―partisan advocacy‖
provides counsel latitude that cannot be justified in the advisor or
counselor setting.97
Moreover, the reasons for allowing attorneys wide expanse in their
presentation of arguments apply only in the advocacy setting; they
have no force in the advice or counseling role.98 The adversary system
allows opposing counsel to counter faulty arguments and expose their
deficiencies, reducing the risk that an erroneous argument will carry
the day.99 Moreover, the disposition of the case lies with the judge or
jury, who render their own independent judgment to distinguish the
faulty from the valid.100 Thus, counsel‘s faulty argument is just that—
an argument, not a call for action as it might be in the counseling role.
In addition, as Daniel Markovits has argued, political principles
support the unbridled role of the advocate: if the parties to a contested
matter are to accord legitimacy to the verdict, which binds them and
may deprive them of liberty and property, it is critical that their
attorney‘s voice be unconstrained in presenting nonfrivolous

communications because the Rule clearly limits candor to the client advisory role. See id. The
attorney‘s obligation of candor to the tribunal is set forth Model Rule 3.3. See id. R. 3.3.
94 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1969, effective in 1970. Nearly every American jurisdiction adopted the Model
Code within a few years. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.11. The Model Code was
superseded by the Model Rules in the 1980s. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
95 MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1980).
96 Id.
97 Id. EC 7-3 n.9.
98 See Fuller & Randall, supra note 76, at 1161 (―The reasons that justify and even require
partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do not grant any license to the lawyer to participate as
legal advisor in a line of conduct that is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality.‖). For a
summary and a powerful critique of the reasons advocates are afforded license in the advocacy
setting, see LUBAN, supra note 15, at 62–64; see also id. at 153–54 (offering a summary account
of the distinction between attorney advocacy and advisory roles). William Simon has likewise
identified an array of lawyer excesses in the adversary system and questioned whether they are
required to further the objectives of justice. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE:
A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS (1998).
99 See LUBAN, supra note 15, at 154 (―Adversarial ideology maintains that judges can do
their interpretive job properly only if they hear the most forceful arguments on all sides, in an
unvarnished form.‖)
100 See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167,
1182 (2005) (discussing the importance of a fully informed tribunal in an adversarial setting).
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arguments that precede the verdict.101 Thus, while the attorney must
not lie about a matter of fact or law in communications to courts and
third parties,102 and may not proffer frivolous arguments to the
court,103 she need not independently assess and agree with each
interpretation or argument that she makes to the court to further the
representation.104
Thus, we can dismiss the expansive interpretation of Rule 2.1: the
Rule does not apply to the attorney‘s advocacy role, notwithstanding
the Rule‘s purported application when the attorney is ―representing
the client.‖105 A contrary interpretation is inconsistent with the title of
the Rule, the distinction between advocacy and counseling first
offered by the Model Code, and the special reasons for affording
counsel wide berth in the advocacy role.106
While lawyers certainly distinguish the advocacy and counseling
role in practice, they may be less sensitive to their critical ethical
differences. The legal profession, of course, understands that much of
its work is outside the courtroom because counseling and furthering
client transactions are central functions of the profession.
Nonetheless, the transactional lawyer still harbors much of the
advocacy ethos of her courtroom colleagues,107 a perception that can
101 DANIEL M ARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE 171–211 (2008).
102 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2009) (prohibiting knowingly making
misstatements of fact or law to the court); id. R. 4.1 (prohibiting knowingly making false
statement of fact or law to third parties).
103 Id. R. 3.1 (providing a lawyer must ground all issues and defenses in proceedings in
nonfrivolous law and fact).
104 MARKOVITS, supra note 101, at 53 (stating that advocates have ―enormous leeway to
promote accounts of the law that they privately reject‖). Markovits further states, ―[A]n
argument ‗. . . is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client‘s position
ultimately will not prevail.‘‖ Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2).
For an early statement of this view, see GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 84 (5th ed. 1884). ―The lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in his
judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge and jury.‖ Id.,
quoted in LUBAN, supra note 15, at 20.
105 This is not to suggest that lawyer independence is beyond discussion in the advocacy
setting. See generally SIMON, supra note 98 (arguing that the advocate is subject to
independence constraints). The claim here is narrower, that the sweep of Model Rule 2.1 does
not extend to advocacy.
106 While the distinction between the advocacy and advisory roles is crucial to
understanding the sweep of Rule 2.1, we must apply the distinction carefully. In the course of a
litigated matter, the lawyer frequently communicates with the client about the client‘s prospects
in the case. The attorney, though engaged in a litigation matter for the client, is not acting as an
advocate in his client communications. Rule 2.1, therefore, requires the lawyer to advise the
client about advocacy matters with independent professional judgment and candor.
107 See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 100, at 1182 (―Ask a securities lawyer why she opposes a
requirement to report out evidence of client fraud, and she is likely to mention the principle of
zealous representation, seemingly unaware that this phrase, as originally stated in the Model
Code, applied only to representation in litigation.‖).
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be explained in part by the failure of ethics codes to honor this
distinction until 1970.108 If we understand all of lawyering through the
prism of advocacy, however, then the demands of independent
professional judgment will be marginalized. It is therefore critical to
be clear that: (1) advocacy and counseling are ethically distinct; and
(2) lawyer independence—whatever it entails—controls the critical
domain beyond advocacy, where attorneys counsel their clients.
2. Nonadvocacy Assistance
If we can safely eliminate advocacy from the sweep of Rule 2.1,
our next question is whether independent professional judgment is
required in all or only certain attorney efforts outside the advocacy
role. As the ABA‘s official comments to the Model Rules make clear,
Rule 2.1 applies when the attorney provides advice to the client.109
The more challenging question is whether the Rule is implicated only
when the attorney provides advice to the client, or whether it also
applies when the attorney assists the client to effect a transaction or
other objective outside the litigation role (which we will term
nonadvocacy assistance). The ABA‘s reference to advice could be
construed to suggest that the drafters contemplated a narrow, adviceonly application of the Rule. On the other hand, the comments may
imply only that advice is the archetypal, but not the sole setting in
which the issue of independence arises outside the advocacy setting.
In addition, the second sentence of Rule 2.1 limits its application to
the advice instances only, suggesting that the ―representation‖
language of the first sentence has reach beyond the advice role.110
Moreover, if the framers of the Rule were intent on limiting its
nonadvocacy reach only to instances of advice, why require the
―exercise [of] independent professional judgment‖ in ―representing
[the] client‖?111 Why not require instead independent judgment ―in
advising the client‖?112 One possible answer is that advice and
108 MODEL CODE OF P ROF ‘ L R ESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 n.9 (1980) (effective in 1970)
(―Today‘s lawyers perform two distinct types of functions, and our ethical standards should, but
in the main do not, recognize these two functions. Judge Philbrick McCoy recently reported to
the American Bar Association the need for a reappraisal of the Canons in light of the new and
distinct function of counselor, as distinguished from advocate, which today predominates in the
legal profession.‖ (quoting E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L.
REV. 575, 578 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109 Model Rules OF P ROF ‘ L C ONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
110 Model Rule 2.1 provides in its entirety: ―In representing a client, a lawyer shall
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client‘s situation.‖ Id. R. 2.1 (emphasis added).
111 Id.
112 In fact, sentence two of the Rule does precisely that. See supra note 110 and
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independent professional judgment are, as a practical matter,
inextricably linked: independent professional judgment, one might
contend, can have no practical effect on a representation outside the
advocacy setting unless it affects the advice provided to the client.
However, there are critical instances outside the advocacy setting
when counsel engages in activities other than advising the client and
independent professional judgment will affect her actions. For
example, when an attorney structures or effects a transaction on
behalf of a client, the behavior of an attorney guided by independent
professional judgment may differ profoundly from that of an attorney
guided only by client interest.113
Moreover, an attorney‘s actions to effect the nonadvocacy ends of
his or her clients may well be tantamount to advice, in that the
attorney‘s actions imply as much about the merits of the transaction to
the client as an express statement. If nonadvocacy assistance is
tantamount to advice, then even under a narrow advice-only view of
Model Rule 2.1, attorneys must exercise independent professional
judgment in providing such assistance. And even if we choose not to
construe assistance as the equivalent of advice, it is curious to require
independent judgment of counsel in one instance and not the other,
especially given that counsel‘s advice and actions are affected by its
exercise.
The evolution of the Model Rule 2.1 offers an additional reason to
conclude that the Rule requires independent professional judgment
not only when providing advice, but in the nonadvocacy-assistance
role generally. The predecessor provision to Model Rule 2.1,
contained in the Model Code, is the first ethical rule to suggest that
attorneys have distinct obligations in the advisory setting.114 Ethical
Canon 7-3 provides:
A lawyer may serve simultaneously as both advocate and
adviser, but the two roles are essentially different. In asserting
a position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most
part deals with past conduct and must take the facts as he
finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as adviser primarily
assists his client in determining the course of future conduct
and relationships. . . . In serving a client as adviser, a lawyer
in appropriate circumstances should give his professional

accompanying text.
113 For an extended discussion of the transaction setting and the role of lawyer
independence, see infra Part IV.C.
114 MODEL Code OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1980).
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opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts would
likely be as to the applicable law.115
If the Canon intended to divide lawyering into two categories,
advocate and advisor, then the latter category presumably included all
nonadvocacy efforts of counsel. Moreover, by characterizing the
advisor role as assisting the client in determining ―future conduct and
relationships,‖116 the Canon implied that attorney actions that
determine such future relationships—i.e., the attorney-transaction
role—should be subject to the demands of lawyer independence as
well.
The purpose of lawyer independence discussed earlier117 also
suggests that Rule 2.1 should apply in the transaction setting as well.
Recall that Rule 2.1 is intended to protect society and third parties
from client wrongdoing by ensuring that attorney advice is
independent and professional. When the lawyer carries out a
transaction on behalf of a client without exercising independent
professional judgment, the risks are comparable to a client who does
not receive the benefit of the lawyer‘s independent professional
judgment about whether a transaction is wrongful. In the latter case,
we are concerned that the client will be insufficiently informed that
her proposed action is wrongful, thereby increasing the prospects that
she will behave wrongfully. In the former, we are concerned that the
lawyer will serve the client‘s objective without assessing its propriety,
again increasing the risk of wrongful behavior. It would be curious, at
best, to require counsel to exercise independent professional judgment
so that the client’s actions are informed, but allow the attorney to act
on behalf of the client unrestrained by such judgment. In each case,
the absence of independent professional judgment poses a substantial
risk to society and to third parties.
Thus, the language, history, and purpose of Rule 2.1 support the
nonadvocacy-assistance interpretation of the Rule. The Rule applies
when the attorney provides advice or assists the client in furthering a
transaction or other nonadvocacy objective. Our next question is how
this understanding of the Rule and its application relates to the agency
view of lawyering described in Part II.

115 Id.

(footnote omitted).

116 Id.
117 See

supra Part III.B.
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D. Agency and Independence Reconciled
Our understanding of the rationale underlying Rule 2.1 allows us
to explore another threshold question: how lawyer independence can
be reconciled with the client-autonomy or agency principles described
in Part II. As we shall see in Part IV, when Rule 2.1 applies, it often
requires counsel to undertake special efforts, including the attorney‘s
inquiry into the factual circumstances and research regarding the legal
standards implicated by the facts.118 The client, however, effectively
has the right under Rule 1.2(a) to establish reasonable limits on the
nature and extent of the services performed by counsel.119 Thus, if the
client does not wish counsel to examine a particular issue, the client
and attorney can agree to such limitations, which are generally
enforced by the courts.120 In this Section, we will examine the
relationship between lawyer independence and client autonomy
embodied by these two provisions of the Model Rules.
When the client expressly or impliedly requests the advice of
counsel on the propriety of a transaction, the client presumably will
not object to the efforts of counsel to develop information sufficient
to answer the question properly.121 When the attorney raises questions
about the propriety of a client‘s proposed transaction, however, the
client may not wish counsel to undertake efforts to examine the
issue—for reasons of expense or because he plans to consummate the
transaction regardless of its propriety. If the attorney has not been
asked to further the transaction, the client can direct counsel not to
examine the issue.122 The more challenging questions arise when the
118 See

infra Part IV.B.2.
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009) (―Subject to paragraphs (c) and
(d), a lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation . . . .‖); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19
(2000) (discussing the requirements a lawyer must fulfill before a lawyer may limit
representation). Although Model Rule 1.2 appears to vest in counsel the right to limit the scope
of the representation, it is in fact indifferent to whether the client or the attorney proposes the
limitation, provided that both attorney and client agree. In practice, the client has considerable
authority under this provision, since the client can terminate the representation if the attorney is
unwilling to agree to the client‘s proposed limitation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT
R. 1.16(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from matter when discharged by client).
120 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 765 A.2d 251, 258–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(upholding attorney-client agreement that attorney would administer estate but would not
provide tax planning).
121 Moreover, the client cannot waive competent representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (noting that although client and lawyer have substantial latitude to limit
representation, ―an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the
duty to provide competent representation‖); see also Cramton, supra note 2, at 146 n.12
(concluding that a client may not waive lawyer competence).
122 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (noting that generally there is no
requirement to provide advice when not requested by client).
119 MODEL
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attorney is working on the transaction about which the attorney
identifies a question or concern. If the client asks the lawyer not to
examine the issue under Model Rule 1.2(c), must the lawyer exercise
independence under Model Rule 2.1? Two examples will allow us to
clarify the issue.
First, suppose that an attorney working on the client‘s transaction
raises the question of whether the tax-allocation scheme specified in
the transaction documents is the most favorable for the client. The
attorney tells the client that, while she is concerned about the
question, she cannot answer it without conducting legal research and
analysis. The client responds that he wishes to minimize cost and
directs counsel not to examine the issue. In effect, the client seeks to
limit the scope of the representation under Model Rule 1.2(c). The
question then becomes whether counsel is obligated under the lawyer
independence requirements of Model Rule 2.1 to reject such
limitation.
While the tax allocation and countless other planning questions
and opportunities of a similar kind arise in the transaction context,
they do not—standing alone—trigger the demands of independent
professional judgment under Model Rule 2.1. Their distinguishing
characteristic is that they are concerned with protection of the client‘s
interests, which—as noted earlier—is not the objective of
independent professional judgment.123 Protection of client interests is,
of course, central to the lawyering role, but the attorney‘s
responsibilities in this regard are captured by the competency
provision of the attorney ethics rules124 and by the attorney‘s duty of
care to the client.125 The duties under both competency and the duty
of care are owed to the client.126 A failure to satisfy either obligation
harms the client and not a third party or a societal interest in avoiding
crime or fraud. The interest at issue belongs to the client, and within
the bounds of competency, it is the client‘s interest to waive. In the
tax-planning example, therefore, the client could, pursuant to Rule
1.2(c), agree with the attorney to a limitation on the scope of the
representation under which the latter will not research the tax
123 See

supra notes 69–82 and accompanying text.
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
125 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
126 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (―A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client.‖); MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 30, § 19.3 (describing the duty of
competence owed to a client as part of the standard of care in a malpractice claim). Although
attorneys can owe duties of care to nonclients in some jurisdictions and circumstances, in this
example the duty to protect client interests is owed strictly to the client. For a discussion of
when courts might extend attorney duties of care to third parties, see infra notes 231–50 and
accompanying text.
124 MODEL
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question or devise a means by which to reduce the tax burden posed
by the transaction.127 The attorney could honor such limitation and
consummate the transaction without violating Model Rule 2.1.
Now suppose instead that the attorney raises the question of
whether the tax-allocation scheme constitutes a criminal tax evasion.
Again, the attorney states that she will need to conduct legal research
and analysis to answer the question, and again suppose that the client
directs her not to do so, either for reasons of cost or because the client
wishes to effect the transaction regardless of its legality. Here, the
question is not what will serve the client best, but whether the
transaction is wrongful. As discussed earlier, Rule 2.1 is designed to
further the societal and third-party interests in reducing wrongful
behavior, not to advance a client interest.128 Societal and third-party
interests are not the client‘s to waive. Therefore, when the issue
expressly or impliedly implicates wrongful behavior, the client‘s
voice in controlling the scope of the representation under Rule 1.2(c)
gives way to the demands of lawyer independence under Rule 2.1.
The very nature of ―independent‖ judgment suggests that it is not
subject to the direction (or caprice) of the client, including the client‘s
insistence that it not be exercised.129
Rule 2.1 is implicated when, in the course of (1) providing advice
to the client; or (2) effecting nonadvocacy ends for the client,
including attorney efforts to structure and effect client transactions, an
attorney has (3) reason to suspect that the client‘s proposed conduct is
criminal or fraudulent. With respect to the third element, the test is an
objective one: when the facts and circumstances present reasonable
grounds for concern or suspicion that the behavior in question might
be wrongful, the attorney‘s obligations under Rule 2.1 attach.130 In
such cases, the lawyer must employ her independent professional
judgment to assess the propriety of the proposed client conduct and
report her conclusions candidly to the client. When the lawyer is
required to exercise independent professional judgment under Rule
2.1, the client cannot waive compliance with the Rule, although he
127 Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 765 A.2d 251, 258–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(upholding attorney-client agreement that attorney would administer estate but would not
provide tax planning).
128 Because our definition of wrongful conduct includes criminal or intentionally
fraudulent behavior, our example could instead have concerned the attorney‘s suspicion that the
transaction would defraud a third party. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the lawyer‘s transaction role when questions of client fraud arise, see infra Part
IV.C.
129 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (noting that advice required under
the Rule may include information that the client is ―disinclined to confront‖).
130 For examples of situations in which counsel should have reason for suspicion of client
wrongdoing, see supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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retains the right to terminate the representation.131 In each instance, if
the client refuses to allow counsel to undertake the actions necessary
to satisfy Rule 2.1, then counsel must withdraw from the matter.132
Lawyer independence, therefore, does not abolish the clientautonomy or agency notions that form the bedrock of modern legal
practice. On the contrary, our interpretation preserves the basic
notions of principal control and identifies those narrowly
circumscribed instances when client autonomy must give way to a
larger interest—protection of society and third parties from criminal
or fraudulent conduct. Exactly what Rule 2.1 requires of counsel in
such instances is the subject of our next inquiry.
IV. WHAT DOES INDEPENDENCE REQUIRE?
A. Introduction
Armed with an understanding of why and when Model Rule 2.1
departs from the agency vision of lawyering, we can now turn to our
central question: what does the Rule require of lawyers? Building on
our earlier findings that the Rule applies when the attorney advises
the client and when she provides nonadvocacy assistance to the client,
we will explore the implications of Rule 2.1 for counsel in advising
and effecting transactions for clients.
B. Advice
Suppose that the client asks the attorney either expressly or by
implication, for advice about the legal propriety of the client‘s
proposed action. As discussed earlier, if the client‘s proposed action
is criminal or fraudulent, and the attorney advises the client of this
fact, the client typically will not undertake the action.133 The accuracy
of the lawyer‘s advice is the sine qua non of this protective enterprise:
the lawyer must accurately assess the propriety of the transaction if
the client is to be diverted from his wrongful design.134
This commitment to accuracy in counseling is a sharp departure
from the truth-finding theory of the adversary system. It is conducted
131 Although the lawyer may charge for her services in conducting such inquiry, a client
who opposes the inquiry for expense or any other reason may choose to terminate the
representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(3) (requiring counsel to
withdraw from a matter when discharged by the client).
132 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring counsel to withdraw
from a matter when continued service will result in violation of the Model Rules).
133 That, at least, is the supposition of the Model Rules. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (―[L]awyers
know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.‖).
134 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (noting also that accurate advice is
necessary if we are to justify the societal costs of affording confidentiality to the consultation).
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outside the adversary setting, and thus cannot take refuge in the
theory that truth will emerge from the clash of viewpoints.135 To
enhance accuracy, Model Rule 2.1 imposes conditions on the
counseling role: ―In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.‖136 Rule
2.1, in other words, is committed to its own theory of truth finding:
accuracy will be enhanced if its conditions are satisfied. While the
elements of Rule 2.1 are inextricably linked, for discussion purposes
we will parse the Rule into three demands—independence,
professional judgment, and candor—and consider each in turn.
1. Independence
As we have discussed, in requiring independence, Rule 2.1 is not
concerned with the lawyer‘s potential conflicts of interest with other
client matters or the lawyer‘s personal interests.137 These concerns are
expressly addressed by other ethics rules.138 As the drafters‘
comments note, the Rule calls for the lawyer‘s ―straightforward
advice‖ and ―honest assessment,‖ even when the advice involves
―unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to
confront.‖139 The danger then is servility—the lawyer‘s unwillingness
to tell the client what he does not want to hear. In their brief
discussion of the Rule, Hazard and Hodes note that a client may want
to have his ―preconceptions confirmed‖ and that the lawyer who
wishes to maintain employment ―may be tempted to play sycophant
to such client.‖140 Rule 2.1, therefore, insists on attorney
independence from the client: if it is to be accurate, an assessment of
the legal propriety of the proposed activity must not be unduly
influenced by the client‘s desire for a favorable answer.
A variety of factors—ranging from economic, to psychological, to
internalized perceptions of the lawyer‘s role—can conspire to
undermine the attorney‘s exercise of independent judgment. The
attorney is, of course, interested in establishing or maintaining a
strong client relationship. For clients committed to lawful and ethical

135 See, e.g., Scontsas v. Citizens Ins. Co. of N.J., 253 A.2d 831, 833 (N.H. 1969) (―It is the
philosophy of the adversary system that the truth will more likely be reached if both sides of the
issue are fully presented . . . .‖). For sources critiquing the adversary theory of truth finding, see
supra note 98.
136 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
137 See id. R 1.7(a)(2) (prohibiting representation due to conflicts of interest); see also id.
R. 1.8 (regulating specific conflicts of interest).
138 E.g., id. R. 1.7; id. R. 1.8.
139 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
140 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 23.2, at 23–3.
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behavior,141 the attorney‘s accurate declaration that the transaction is
improper will pose no threat to the relationship, and should in most
instances enhance it.142 With clients less concerned about propriety
than profit, however, the attorney may perceive that a negative
answer will weaken or threaten the relationship.143 Some clients may
even press for a favorable opinion from counsel before acting in the
hope that it will lessen the legal sanctions if the behavior is later
challenged.144 With these clients, the attorney may feel economic
pressure to tell the client what she wants to hear.145 Even when
professionals try to rise above such economic concerns, bias can work
below the level of cognition.146
The attorney may also be subject to a more subtle strain. The
attorney wants to help the client reach his objective; after all, she was
hired to assist the client in some way. Loyalty and client trust in the

141 See ETHICS RES. CTR., 2009 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: ETHICS IN THE
RECESSION 38 (2009), available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes/files/nbes-final.pdf (reporting
that eighty-nine percent of employees surveyed said that ―top management talks about the
importance of workplace ethics and ‗doing the right thing‘‖).
142 For example, the former General Counsel of General Electric has urged lawyers to
―think about the ethical, reputational, and enlightened self-interest of their client.‖ Ben W.
Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596, 599–600 (2006) (emphasis
omitted).
143 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of
Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 38–39 (2003) (―[A]
corporation‘s lawyer has a personal, financial interest in currying favor with senior managers by
facilitating any corporate transaction that enhances their wealth, even if the transaction is not
wealth enhancing for corporate shareholders.‖); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1220 (2005) (noting that a corporation‘s lawyers do not want to be
perceived as ―obstructionists who tell the client what it cannot do‖).
144 The advice of counsel may be admissible when the client‘s mens rea, such as malice or
intentionality, is at issue. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 29(1) (2000); see also SIMON, supra note 7, at 1557 (noting instances in which attorneys‘ ―bad
advice made life easier for the clients because, regardless of its merit, it conferred on them a
significant measure of immunity from liability or public criticism‖).
145 See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1006 (2005) (―[I]nside counsel feels unremitting
pressure to justify herself and her department as a corporate cost center. . . . The best way to do
so is to facilitate, not interfere with, corporate transactions favored by management.‖); TASK
FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS‘N, REPORT 14–15 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf (―The competition to
acquire and keep client business, or the desire to advance within the corporate executive
structure, may induce lawyers to seek to please the corporate officials with whom they deal
rather than to focus on the long-term interest of their client, the corporation.‖). In his seminal
work, sociologist Robert Nelson found a lack of autonomy in large-firm practice in part because
power within the firm is reposed in partners with the strongest client associations, who
internalize client perceptions. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 227–228 (1988).
146 See Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence:
Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10, 16 (2006) (―Evidence
on unconscious bias suggests that people are not very good at disregarding their own selfinterest and evaluating information impartially, even when they try to do so.‖).
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attorney are bedrocks of the relationship.147 These are the virtues,
however, of the agency vision of lawyering described in Part II,
which, as noted, captures only a portion of the lawyer‘s ethical
commitment.148 The goal of independent professional judgment is not
to serve the client‘s interest, but to provide an objective analysis of
whether a proposed action is wrongful and, therefore, a risk to society
and third parties.149 This presents no minor intellectual or emotional
challenge for an attorney who sees himself as the facilitator of the
client‘s objectives.150 The attorney who understands herself
principally as the agent of the client‘s objectives can easily transmute
this understanding into a desire to find a way to say yes to the client‘s
inquiry into whether she can proceed as planned.151 Rule 2.1 requires
that counsel resist the gravitational pull of the client in analyzing the
propriety of proposed conduct.
The independence required by Rule 2.1 should be distinguished
from another form of lawyer independence, what might be termed
client-protection independence. Lawyers serve the client well by
challenging the client (or, in the corporate setting, management) who
ignores or underestimates the civil and criminal perils of
wrongdoing.152 In addition to simple greed, profit pressures, group
think, rationalization, the difficulty in visualizing the victim, and
scores of other cognitive distortions can confound management‘s
assessment of the propriety or risk posed by their behavior.153 Thus,
for many attorneys, the skills of argument are not deployed solely to
persuade courts and third parties of the client‘s cause; they are also
147 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009) (stating that trust is the
―hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship‖).
148 See supra Part III.D.
149 See supra Part III.B.
150 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2009) (analyzing the ―cognitive biases arising from partisan kinship between lawyer
and client‖). Two decades earlier, Robert Nelson found strong client identification that made it
unlikely that large-firm lawyers ―will act as an independent voice that checks the self-interest of
clients.‖ NELSON, supra note 145, at 5–6.
151 Robertson, supra note 150, at 30 (―[A]ttorneys with role identities closely aligned to the
client‘s goals may be subject to the same cognitive distortions suffered by the client, him or
herself. Thus, clients may face a conundrum in which the most dedicated attorneys are the worst
positioned to offer independent counsel.‖). For a discussion of how close association with
management can affect the judgment of inside counsel, see Kim, supra note 145, at 1004. Kim
describes inside counsel‘s relationship with its management as a ―psychological contract.‖ Id.
For a discussion of how cognitive distortions can affect lawyering, see generally David Luban,
Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279 (2003).
152 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 17.7 (noting that counsel may have to exercise
independent professional judgment to determine what is in the corporation‘s best interest).
153 For an excellent discussion of how these and other ―traps‖ can distort the reasoning of
businesspersons, see generally ROBERT HOYK & PAUL HERSEY, THE ETHICAL EXECUTIVE:
BECOMING AWARE OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR: 45 TRAPS THAT EVERY
ONE OF US FALLS PREY TO (2008).
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the tools to persuade the client that she will be harmed by the
proposed wrongful action.154
At some point, however, the client may demur and insist that the
attorney further the transaction despite the lawyer‘s concerns, perhaps
because the client is unmoved by the attorney‘s arguments about the
client‘s self interest.155 When the attorney knows that the proposed
conduct is wrongful, she has no choice but to refuse a directive to
further the client‘s transaction.156 When the attorney does not have
knowledge but has reason for concern about the propriety of the
transaction, however, she may mistakenly conclude that she can
proceed without further inquiry if the client insists. After all—the
attorney might reason—if her gadfly efforts are designed to protect
the client, then the client should have the right, at some point, to
refuse such protection. The premise, however, is incorrect: the
independence required by Rule 2.1 is designed to protect society and
third parties rather than the client, and, therefore, the client does not
control its exercise157—as we will see in our discussion of transaction
practice.158
2. Professional Judgment
It is not enough that counsel differentiate from the client‘s goals
and independently assess the client‘s proposed action. If Rule 2.1
demanded only independence, then the lawyer could provide her own
subjective ―take‖ on the issue. In fact, however, the Rule seeks to
ensure that the client receives an accurate assessment of the propriety
of the proposed action, so that the client will refrain from the act if the
lawyer advises that it is wrongful.159 Rule 2.1, therefore, couples
independence with a demand of professional judgment, imposing an
154 See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and
Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 30 (2006)
(discussing attorney efforts to persuade the client to do the right thing).
155 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Values of
Professionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 39 (1999) (noting that ―there will be cases in
which promoting [the client‘s] enlightened self-interest will be at odds with achieving justice.‖)
156 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (providing that a lawyer may not
assist or counsel a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct).
157 See supra Part III.D.
158 See infra Part IV.C.
159 See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. Brad Wendel argues that professional
judgment serves a caretaker role. Law establishes normative positions on contested matters, and
thereby allows for the ―coordinated activity‖ of a society. Only a professional, rather than a
partial, interpretation of the law will enable the law to accomplish its goals. Wendel, supra note
100, at 1184. Wendel has recently developed these and other arguments into a book-length
account. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010) [hereinafter, Wendel,
FIDELITY TO LAW]. See also Gordon, supra note 2, at 20–21 (arguing that lawyers who look for
loopholes in the law undermine its purpose).
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additional, critical restraint on the advice provided by counsel.160
Professional judgment consists of a procedural and substantive
component, as we shall describe below.
Rule 2.1 demands the independent professional judgment of
counsel in order to increase the prospects that the attorney‘s advice
will be accurate.161 Uninformed advice is unlikely to be accurate.
Thus, when the attorney provides advice, it must be grounded on
sufficient information if it is to be ―professional,‖ as required by
Model Rule 2.1. This is the procedural condition of professional
judgment.162 When the attorney advises a client that a client‘s
proposed act is lawful, that advice must be grounded on sufficient
inquiry into the specifics of the client‘s proposed transaction, together
with all other facts rendered relevant by the applicable law, as well as
sufficient review of the law itself.163 As a result, in some instances,
the attorney who is asked to advise the client on the propriety of the
proposed action may be required to learn considerably more about the
transaction than the client has originally disclosed.164 If the client
refuses to provide such information then, under our proposed
construction of Rule 2.1, the attorney will be barred from providing
the advice.
The substantive element of professional judgment concerns the
attorney‘s interpretation of the facts that she has learned and her
analysis of the legal significance of those facts. With respect to the
former, the goal is to develop an accurate account of the facts that
will ground the legal analysis.165 With respect to the legal analysis,
160 For a discussion of the relationship between professional judgment and the accuracy of
an attorney‘s analysis in a related context, see Kevin H. Michels, Internal Corporate
Investigations and the Truth, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 83, 104 (2010).
161 See supra notes 81–93 and accompanying text.
162 In other settings, courts have questioned the value of a decision that is not informed.
For example, a patient‘s medical consent is not valid unless it is ―informed,‖ which generally
requires sufficient understanding of the facts on which the decision is to be based. E.g., Cobbs v.
Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972) (―[The patient‘s right of self decision] can be effectively
exercised only if the patient possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice.‖).
The Model Rules will not accept a client decision to waive a conflict of interest without
―informed‖ consent, which requires a communication of ―adequate information‖ prior to such
decision. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2009) (requiring ―informed
consent‖); id. 1.0(e) (defining ―informed consent‖).
163 With respect to the latter, one can draw an analogy to the competency standard of
Model Rule 1.1, which would be breached by the lawyer‘s ―failure to ascertain readily
accessible precedents.‖ HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 3–5.
164 When the client seems less than forthcoming or her answers less than credible, the
attorney may need to inquire more deeply. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. If such
inquiry proves impracticable, then the attorney must withdraw from the matter because she is
unable to satisfy Rule 2.1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring
withdrawal if representation will violate the Model Rules).
165 Here, as elsewhere, the ―independence‖ and ―professional judgment‖ elements of Rule
2.1 overlap. In developing an accurate account, the lawyer must not only exercise professional
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the goal—again—is accuracy. In some instances, the law will be
patently clear on the issue implicated by the facts, and the propriety of
the client‘s proposed conduct will be obvious to the lawyer.166 At
other times, assessment of the client‘s proposed conduct will require
interpretation of laws or court decisions that are less than clear, either
in their language or in their application to the client‘s factual
particulars.167 This interpretive element is not license for the attorney
to offer her own idiosyncratic take on the propriety of the client‘s
conduct. Rule 2.1 calls for the lawyer‘s professionally grounded,
objective assessment of the propriety of the proposed conduct.
In exercising independent professional judgment, the lawyer‘s role
is analogous to that of the judge whose ―choice is constrained by a set
of rules (or norms, standards, principles, guides, etc.) that are
authorized by the professional community of which the judge is
part.‖168 Thus, the lawyer must employ accepted professional
standards of legal interpretation and reasoning to interpret the law and
apply it to the client‘s facts to form the conclusions that will ground
her legal advice. Professional judgment does not require a literal
reading of a legal authority when ―a myopic fixation on the literal
language of the statute would cause an interpreter to miss [the]
apparent meaning of the text.‖169 As Robert Gordon has argued:
[L]awyers who recommend only the most literal forms of
compliance and widen every loophole far enough to drive a
truck through . . . will end up effectively frustrating the
purposes of their clients as well as the legal rules. The lawyer
under such an ethical regime is by vocation someone who
helps clients find ways around the law.170
Rule 2.1 affords confidentiality to attorney-client discussions at great
societal cost in order to encourage attorney consultation and enhance

judgment, but must resist the client‘s insistence on a more favorable interpretation at the
expense of such accuracy. See supra Part IV.B.1.
166 Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 488, 489–90 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). The discussion in this and the
following three paragraphs draws in part on my analysis of professional judgment in Michels,
supra note 160, at 104–10.
167 Id.
168 Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 183 (1985) (footnote
omitted). Brad Wendel argues persuasively that legal interpretation can and must transcend the
subjective assessment of the attorney. The interpretive effort instead seeks to honor the purpose
of the rule in question and is grounded in the interpretative standards of the relevant community.
Wendel, FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 159, at § 6.3.
169 Wendel, supra note 100, at 1187.
170 Gordon, supra note 2, at 20–21.
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legal compliance.171 Thus, the Rule requires counsel to use the
accepted tools of interpretation to determine the accurate meaning of
the statute or other legal authority uninfluenced by the client‘s
objectives.
When the client asks her attorney whether she may undertake a
proposed action, the attorney may reach one of three conclusions after
she has learned the facts and analyzed the legal propriety of a
transaction. First, she may conclude that the transaction is proper.
Second, she may conclude that the transaction is wrongful, i.e.,
criminal or fraudulent.172 The attorney should qualify these
conclusions when there is genuine risk that a court will disagree with
the attorney‘s conclusion.173 This qualification allows the client to
understand the limits of the attorney‘s advice, and to govern his
behavior mindful of the risk that a court may judge it differently than
the lawyer.174 The qualification does not eliminate the attorney‘s
ethical obligation to exercise independent professional judgment
under Rule 2.1, however. The lawyer‘s advice, even when qualified,
may prove decisive in the client‘s assessment of whether to undertake
or refrain from the proposed action. Thus, the advice (and its
qualification or absence) must be guided and constrained by
professional judgment.175

171 See

supra Part III.B.
an explanation of why term ―wrongful‖ is limited to these instances, see supra
notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
173 See Margolis Memorandum, supra note 11, at 68–69 (finding that ―Yoo and Bybee
exercised poor judgment by overstating the certainty of their conclusions and underexposing
countervailing arguments,‖ but concluding that the deficiencies did not rise to the level of
professional misconduct). Under the interpretation of Rule 2.1 offered here, advice that claims
or implies certainty when professional judgment dictates otherwise would violate Rule 2.1.
174 Moreover, if there is a genuine risk that a court will disagree with the lawyer‘s
interpretation, the ethical duties of competency and communication owed to the client require
disclosure of such information to the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1
(2009) (requiring competent representation of clients); id. R. 1.4(b) (requiring that a lawyer
explain the matter to a client to the extent reasonably necessary to allow the client to make
informed decisions).
175 Some attorneys prefer to couch their advice as an evaluation of the probability or
likelihood that the proposed act will be deemed wrongful, rather than offering a conclusion
about the propriety of the conduct coupled with qualifications. Both approaches are likely to
influence the client‘s behavior and thus both are subject to the strictures of Model Rule 2.1
discussed here; that is, regardless of its form, the attorney‘s advice must be guided and
constrained by professional judgment. In regulating attorneys who render certain opinions that
taxpayers use to avoid penalties, the Department of Treasury‘s regulations offer an interesting
example outside the Model Rules context of the ―likelihood‖ approach. The regulations require
that an attorney set forth ―the likelihood that the taxpayer will prevail on the merits‖ for each
significant federal tax issue addressed in the opinion. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(ii) (2009).
Moreover, if a practitioner ―fails to reach a conclusion at a confidence level of at least more
likely than not‖ on a given issue, then the opinion cannot be relied on by the taxpayer to avoid
penalties. Id.
172 For
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A third possibility is indeterminacy;176 that is, in the professional
judgment of counsel, it cannot be determined whether the transaction
is criminal or fraudulent. A law is not indeterminate, however, simply
because it requires interpretation or because the attorney‘s assessment
is less than certain. Indeterminacy for our purposes signifies that the
attorney cannot, by employing the interpretative standards that
comprise professional judgment, determine which interpretation is
correct.177
Because professional judgment is an act of constrained
interpretation, lawyers may disagree in their assessment of the
propriety of a proposed act and still be within the boundaries of
professional judgment.178 Moreover, the test of compliance with the
professional judgment element of Rule 2.1 is not an exercise in
hindsight. The question is whether the attorney‘s interpretation was
grounded in the standards of the professional community, 179 not
whether the attorney got the ―right‖ answer as measured by a
subsequent court decision or other ruling on the matter.180 The
converse, however, is equally true and critically important for our
purposes here: while there may be more than one legitimate
assessment of the client‘s proposed conduct, some assessments are
unacceptable because they are beyond the boundaries of professional
judgment.
3. Candor
The obligation under Rule 2.1 to report candidly to the client flows
naturally from the requirement of independent professional judgment.
Again, the goal is to ensure that the client receives an accurate
assessment and refrains from activities that counsel has advised are
wrongful. If independence and professional judgment increase the
prospects that the attorney will make the correct assessment, then
176 But see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (suggesting that the term ―underdeterminate‖ may better
capture the instance in which more than one, but not necessarily any, interpretation is
legitimate).
177 For a discussion of the significance of these three findings in the transactional context,
see infra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
178 See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 748 (1982)
(noting that ―objectivity is compatible with a measure of disagreement‖).
179 See Fiss, supra note 168, at 183 (noting in connection with legal decisions that
―[a]dherence to the rules authorized by the professional community . . . provides the standards
for evaluating the correctness of the judgment as a legal judgment‖ ).
180 See Wendel, supra note 100, at 1195 (―An observer might disagree with B, and believe
that A was the better result, but nevertheless concede that B was within the range of plausible,
justifiable results.‖). For discussion of how courts might apply this standard in the disciplinary
or liability setting, see infra Part V.C–D.
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candor ensures that the assessment is accurately transmitted to the
client. The attorney must resist the temptation to report what the
client wants to hear rather than the findings of her independent
professional assessment.181
The attorney need not limit her advice to a conclusion, of course.
The attorney should explain how she reached the conclusion that she
presents to the client.182 As noted earlier, when the law could
legitimately be interpreted to support a contrary view, the attorney
should disclose this fact to the client so the client understands that the
attorney does not claim certainty in her conclusion.183 Of course, in
the advisory role, the attorney typically does not dictate what action
the client takes once he has the benefit of the attorney‘s accurate
assessment of the propriety of the proposed action.184 As we shall see
next, however, when the attorney takes steps to further the client‘s
goals in the nonadvocacy setting, lawyer independence imposes even
greater demands on counsel.
C. Transactions
As we have seen, the attorney must satisfy a number of lawyerindependence obligations in advising the client on a question
concerning the legal propriety of the client‘s proposed behavior.
When the attorney furthers a transaction for the client, however, the
attorney moves from advisor to facilitator of the client‘s actions. In
the latter role, for reasons we shall discuss, lawyer independence is
even more demanding of counsel. Properly understood, these
demands can fundamentally change the role of the transactional
lawyer.
Suppose that an attorney for a corporation is retained to handle a
real-estate syndication. Although the corporation‘s prior law firm and
auditor recently resigned, the attorney accepts the financial
information provided by the client, which she includes in the offering
materials to investors.185 Suppose further that, based on the curious
181 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (―[A] lawyer should not
be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the
client.‖).
182 See Wendel, supra note 100, at 1190 (transparent justification ―defends the judgment‘s
objectivity against the critique that the interpreter is simply imposing her own policy
preferences on the law.‖)
183 See supra notes 166–67.
184 The attorney may have obligations to ―report up‖ within the organization, however. See
infra notes 259–64.
185 The fact pattern is inspired by, but is not intended as an accurate summary of, FDIC v.
O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 746–47 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), in
which the Ninth Circuit analyzed the investors‘ claims under the duty of care, without
considering Rule 2.1.
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nature of the events, the lawyer has reason to suspect but does not
know that the transaction is criminal or fraudulent. On the traditional
understanding of the Model Rules, a lawyer—unencumbered by the
demands of lawyer independence—would face no barriers under the
attorney ethics rules to providing such assistance. Under Rule 1.2(d),
the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct is criminal or
fraudulent.186 The Model Rules, in turn, define ―knowingly‖ as ―actual
knowledge of the fact in question.‖187 Therefore, while the attorney
on our example harbors well-founded suspicions, they do not amount
to the knowledge necessary to preclude his participation under Rule
1.2(d).188
In this situation, the attorney may choose not to ask the client
about her suspicions. If knowledge of wrongdoing is the test of
whether the attorney can proceed, the attorney‘s ignorance here is a
blessing of perverse kind. It rewards indifference or willful blindness
of counsel. Why learn more, one might ask, when the client has not
asked counsel to do so? Such knowledge is not necessary to fulfill the
client‘s ends (on the client‘s reckoning, at least), and knowledge of
wrongdoing—once gained—could preclude the attorney from
assisting the client.189 In the corporate scandals of recent history, a
regular defense—and not coincidentally a source of sharp criticism—
of transactional counsel was that they did not inquire into the bona
fides of the transactions they furthered.190
Now let us consider whether lawyer independence under our
proposed construction of Rule 2.1 demands a different response. First,
we concluded earlier that Rule 2.1 requires that counsel exercise
independent professional judgment in providing nonadvocacy
assistance to the client, which includes furthering client
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).
R. 1.0(f).
188 See New York City Bar Report, supra note 8, at 453–54 (noting that the Model Rules
contain no provision requiring further investigation when a lawyer suspects client wrongdoing).
A central claim of this Article is that this reading of the Model Rules is correct as a general
matter, but false when the lawyer is furthering a transaction that he has reason to suspect is
wrongful. In the latter instance, the lawyer-independence demand of Model Rule 2.1 requires
inquiry.
189 One answer is that the client may benefit from input of counsel who is well informed
about a transaction. As we have discussed, however, the protection of client interests is not the
goal of lawyer independence and, therefore, can be waived by the client. See supra Parts III.D
and IV.B.1.
190 See, e.g., New York City Bar Report, supra note 8, at 431–32 (―[L]awyers, either inhouse or outside, appear to have been strategically positioned with respect to a significant
number of these scandals. . . . Where questions were not asked or pressed, it is reasonable to
believe that more assertive action might have avoided or mitigated wrongdoing in some of these
situations.‖); Simon, supra note 9, at 1457 (noting, with respect to Enron, that ―[t]here is no
indication that these professionals ever asked the question, ‗Is this misleading?‘‖).
186 MODEL
187 Id.
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transactions.191 Second, we have concluded that, when there is reason
for concern about the propriety of a transaction, an attorney must
obtain sufficient information before furthering the transaction in order
to satisfy the procedural element of professional judgment.192 Thus, in
our example, the circumstances require the attorney to inquire more
deeply into the facts and circumstances before acting. A reasonable
inquiry presumably would seek the reasons for the auditor and law
firm‘s resignations, and, if their responses do not assuage the lawyer‘s
suspicion that the proposed transaction is fraudulent, further inquiry
into the bona fides of the financial statements that will ground the
offering.193 Our concern here, however, is less with the particulars of
the lawyer‘s inquiry, which necessarily vary with circumstance, than
with the underlying principle: Rule 2.1 requires sufficient inquiry of
counsel before furthering a transaction that counsel has reason to
suspect is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer may also need to
conduct research sufficient to determine the legal standards
implicated by the facts and circumstances before acting.194
The lawyer‘s obligation under Rule 2.1 to inquire into the facts
and propriety of the transaction is not a general obligation of inquiry;
it is, in fact, precisely contoured. The lawyer is obligated to inquire
under the Rule only if she has reason for suspicion that the client‘s
proposed transaction is wrongful and the attorney plans to assist the
client in furthering the matter.195 Moreover, the client is free to refuse
the lawyer‘s efforts to investigate the facts and research the law.196
Adequate factual and legal knowledge remains, however, a condition
of the lawyer‘s services prior to consummating a transaction that she
191 See

supra Part III.C.2.
supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
193 Although the context differs, ABA opinions considering the nature and extent of
investigation necessary to offer an opinion letter are instructive here. See ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974) (―If any of the alleged facts, or the
alleged facts taken as a whole, are incomplete in a material respect; or are suspect; or are
inconsistent; or either on their face or on the basis of other known facts are open to question, the
lawyer should make further inquiry.‖); ABA Comm. on Legal Opinions, Legal Opinion
Principles, 53 BUS. LAW. 831, 833 (1998) (requiring further inquiry if information ―appears
irregular on its face or has been provided by an inappropriate source‖).
194 See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
195 For this reason, Model Rule 2.1 as interpreted here is entirely consistent with the
ABA‘s comment that the Rule does not require the attorney to initiate investigation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (2009). When the client has asked the
attorney to further a client transaction, he has asked the attorney to ―represent‖ him in the
matter. Thus, the attorney is not investigating the client ―out of the blue‖ or on her own
initiative; she is gaining the information necessary to exercise independent professional
judgment in a matter in which she is already representing the client. See id. R. 2.1 (requiring
independent professional judgment in ―representing a client‖). For an analysis of why Rule 2.1
applies in the transaction setting generally, see supra Part III.C.2.
196 See supra Part III.D.
192 See
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has reason to suspect is criminal or fraudulent. Thus, while the client
has a right to refuse counsel‘s efforts to learn more, the lawyer who is
denied such access has no choice but to withdraw from the matter,
since to proceed in ignorance would violate Rule 2.1.197
After counsel has exercised independent professional judgment to
(1) determine the facts, and (2) access the legal propriety of a
transaction that posed reason for concern, she may reach one of three
conclusions as discussed in Part IV(B)(2). First, if counsel concludes
that the transaction is proper, i.e., not criminal or fraudulent, the
attorney can consummate the transaction. Second, if counsel
concludes that the transaction is criminal or fraudulent, she may not
assist the client in the transaction.198 In this instance, Rule 2.1 plays a
critical role in the transactional setting: it eliminates willful blindness
by insisting that an attorney gain knowledge before furthering a
suspect transaction. That knowledge, in turn, triggers an obligation
that can no longer be circumvented through ignorance—to withhold
complicity in a transaction that the lawyer now knows is wrongful.199
Third, if counsel concludes that, despite employing the
interpretative standards that comprise independent professional
judgment, she cannot determine whether the transaction is criminal or
fraudulent (―indeterminate‖ or ―indeterminacy‖),200 the attorney‘s role
is governed by Rule 1.2(d). Rule 1.2(d), while prohibiting knowing
assistance of a client‘s criminal or fraudulent behavior, permits
attorneys to ―counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.‖201
A lawyer who consummates a criminal or fraudulent client
transaction without knowledge of its wrongful nature is subject to
three challenges under the construction of lawyer independence
offered here. First, did the proposed transaction present reasonable
grounds for the lawyer to suspect that it was wrongful? If not, then
Rule 2.1 does not impose a barrier to furthering the transaction. If the
197 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring counsel to withdraw from
representation that will result in violation of the Model Rules).
198 Id. R. 1.2(d) (prohibiting attorney from assisting client in transaction that lawyer knows
is ―criminal or fraudulent‖). A more delicate question is whether the lawyer can assist the client
when she believes that the law prohibiting the proposed action is invalid. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 cmt. e (2000) (discussing the standards for
testing the legal validity or applicability of a law).
199 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).
200 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting that a matter is not indeterminate
simply because it requires interpretation).
201 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(2)(b) (prohibiting knowing assistance of crime or fraud but
allowing the lawyer to ―counsel or assist a client in conduct when the lawyer reasonably
believes . . . that the client can assert a nonfrivolous argument that the client‘s conduct will not
constitute a crime or fraud or violate a court order‖).
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transaction presented such grounds, however, our next question is
whether the attorney gained the requisite factual and legal information
to assess the bona fides of the transaction? If not, then the attorney
has perforce failed to exercise the professional judgment required by
Rule 2.1, since the judgment—to the extent it was exercised at all—
was insufficiently informed.202 Third, was the attorney‘s conclusion
that the transaction was proper independent of the client and within
the boundaries of professional judgment?203 If not, then the attorney
has violated Rule 2.1.
This construction of the independence requirement of Model Rule
2.1 would represent a significant change in the attorney‘s
responsibilities in furthering transactions. Absent our proposed
reading of Model Rule 2.1, attorneys would be free to consummate
such transactions under the ethics rules, even when they have reason
to suspect client wrongdoing, because such suspicion does not rise to
the level of knowledge that requires withdrawal.204 On the
interpretation of Model Rule 2.1 offered here, however, counsel can
no longer remain uninformed or agnostic about the propriety of the
transaction she furthers: with respect to the transaction‘s propriety,
her participation is, in an important sense, her imprimatur.
V. AN INVITATION TO THE STATES
A. Introduction
Our final question is how the states can implement the new
understanding of lawyer independence developed in this Article. We
will begin with a discussion of the role of the states in advancing the
law of lawyering and how that role relates to the interpretation of
lawyer independence offered here.205 Next, we consider how our
proposed interpretation would play out in the two theaters that
address attorney conduct—discipline and liability. Finally, we explore
how the lawyer-independence standard proposed here relates to the
202 For

a discussion of this procedural element of professional judgment, see supra notes

162–64.
203 For

a discussion of how this standard should be applied by courts, see infra Part V.
supra note 9 and accompanying text (collecting sources objecting to the passive
role of counsel in transactions resulting in crimes or fraud).
205 Reform by the states of the law of lawyer independence will also have a substantial
effect on the federal courts, which typically apply the attorney ethics rules of the state in which
they sit. E.g., W.D. WASH. G.R. 2(e), available at http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/documents
/HomePageAnnouncements/2009%20Local%20Rules/Final%20Local%20General%20Rules%2
0for%20website.pdf (requiring compliance with the ―Washington Rules of Professional
Conduct, as promulgated, amended, and interpreted by the Washington State Supreme
Court . . . and the decisions of any court applicable thereto‖). See generally HAZARD & HODES,
supra note 1, § 1.17 (providing background on attorney ethics in federal courts).
204 See
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lawyer‘s duties under other lawyering standards, including SarbanesOxley and Model Rule 1.13.
B. The Opportunity for Reform
Attorney regulation is generally the province of the states.206
Nearly every state has adopted an attorney ethics code grounded on
the Model Rules drafted by the American Bar Association.207 The
states typically construe these ethics rules in four settings: through
committee opinions that guide the day-to-day practice of attorneys;208
in the attorney-disciplinary setting, where attorneys are sanctioned for
violations of the rules and the decisions interpreting them;209 in the
litigation setting, where ethics rules that bear on the conduct of
counsel are interpreted and applied;210 and in liability cases against
counsel as evidence of the standard of care.211 Each of these
committee or court interpretations of the Model Rules establishes
precedent that can shape the behavior of attorneys in the jurisdiction.
The state-based nature of attorney regulation offers a special
opportunity for reform of the law of lawyer independence. In the
years since the states adopted their own versions of the Model
Rules,212 each has imposed its own interpretive imprint on the law of
lawyer conduct—through its committee and court interpretations of
the rules in the advisory, disciplinary, and litigation settings.213 Thus,

206 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.3 (cataloging the sources of the law of
lawerying). In recent years, the federal government has increasingly regulated attorneys, often in
specialized areas. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 961
(2009) (describing the growth of federal regulation of attorney ethics). Part V.E., infra, will
consider an important instance of federal attorney regulation, Sarbanes-Oxley, and its relation to
the interpretation of Model Rule 2.1 proposed herein.
207 See LAWYERS‘ M ANUAL, supra note 1, at 01:11 to :82 (July 27, 2005) (describing how
the ethics rules adopted in each state differ from the Model Rules). In this Part V, we will
continue our discussion of the Model Rules because they are in effect in nearly every
jurisdiction. See supra note 4. In actual court cases, however, a committee or court would apply
the ethics rule in effect in its jurisdiction. The states have for the most part adopted Model Rule
2.1 without substantial change. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., In re Goldstein, 560 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.J. 1989) (holding that lawyers can be
disciplined for failure to comply with committee opinions construing the Model Rules).
209 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. b (2000)
(discussing enforcement of ethics rules).
210 See generally LAWYERS‘ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 799:201 to :310 (May 26, 2010)
(collecting court cases construing attorney ethics rules across jurisdictions in litigated matters).
211 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 20 (2009) (―[A] lawyer‘s violation of a
Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.‖); see also Developments
in the Law: Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1567
(1994) (noting that most courts allow discussion of ethics violation as evidence of negligence by
counsel).
212 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text.
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the law governing lawyers, although uniform in its general outline, is
subject to considerable variation among the states in its particulars.
Unlike corporation law, states are not engaged in a ―race to the
bottom‖ in lawyer regulation.214 In fact, states visualize themselves
more as gatekeepers of the bar to protect the public, by administering
the bar exam, imposing character and fitness checks, and having
continuing-legal-education requirements.215 In many ways, the stateby-state approach to lawyer regulation offers the long-claimed
opportunity of federalism: the states serve as laboratories to
experiment and change the law governing lawyers.
The lawyer-independence reforms presented in this Article require
no revision of the state-specific Rules of Professional Conduct
because nearly every state has adopted Rule 2.1.216 Instead, this
Article proposes that states analyze and apply the Rule in a manner
that is consistent with: its text and history, the Rule‘s relationship to
the other Model Rules, and our understanding of the profession and its
commitments. It is a call, therefore, for courts and ethics committees
to breathe life into Rule 2.1 and lawyer independence, not through
wholesale change, but by reasoned interpretation and construction of
a Rule that is already on their books. If states are troubled by the
corporate scandals of recent decades and the passivity of lawyers who

214 Corporation-law scholars do not universally accept the implication of the phrase ―race
to the bottom.‖ See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 130
(2009) (noting that corporation law can be viewed as a race to the bottom if corporate statutes
are directed at managers who make reincorporation decisions, and a race to the top if the goal is
to satisfy shareholders).
215 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 2 (2000) (discussing
admission to the practice of law).
216 The language of the ABA‘s Model Rule 2.1 has been adopted verbatim by forty-four
states. Three states have adopted it with additional language concerning alternative dispute
resolution (Alaska, Colorado and Hawaii). See Links to Other Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Pages, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010)
(providing links to ethics rules of each state). Georgia and Texas have adopted versions of
Model Rule 2.1 with slight modifications. Texas‘s version reads in its entirety: ―In advising or
otherwise representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice.‖ TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.01 (2005),
available at http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Grievance_Info_and_Ethics
_Helpline&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=96. The version of Rule 2.1
adopted in Georgia reads: ―In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. A lawyer shall not be deterred from giving
candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. The maximum
penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.‖ GA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R 2.1
(2001), available at http://www.gabar.org/handbook/part_iv_after_january_1_2001_-_georgia_
rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_21_advisor. And finally, the California State Bar Board of
Governors recommended the adoption of Model Rule 2.1 in September 2009. However, the
proposal has not yet been approved by the Supreme Court of California. Proposed Rules of
Professional Conduct, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Committees/
RulesCommission/ProposedRulesofProfessionalConduct.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
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counseled these corporations and furthered their transactions,217 the
tools of reform are well within reach. The states already insist on
lawyer independence in name; it is now time to insist on it in practice.
It is worth reflecting on why Rule 2.1 has been largely moribund
for ethical and liability purposes;218 and why the Rule—once
understood—will require the close attention of courts, disciplinary
authorities, practitioners, and harmed third parties. By assuming that
Rule 2.1 is simply another means to protect clients,219 the courts have
marginalized its disciplinary and liability significance. The client is
not likely to file a disciplinary action against a lawyer for providing
advice or furthering a transaction that is consistent with the client‘s
wishes but risks harming third parties through wrongful conduct.
Thus, a lack of lawyer independence is rarely a source of client
grievance. For a client who is aggrieved by the lawyer‘s failure to
provide accurate advice with respect to the state of the law or to
handle a matter properly, the ethical breach—if any—is a failure of
competence,220 not independence. Moreover, the client‘s principal
liability remedy for inaccurate advice is a malpractice claim against
the lawyer for breach of the duty of care, a claim unrelated to lawyer
independence.221
When we replace the faulty agency-based conception of Rule 2.1
with its real purpose—the protection of society and third parties
against client wrongdoing222—the disciplinary and liability
implications of the Rule come into bold relief. Third parties and
society can be harmed by an absence of lawyer independence. Third
parties and society, not clients, have reason and incentive to invoke
the Rule in the disciplinary and liability setting. We will consider next
how our proposed interpretation of Rule 2.1 plays out in such settings.

217 See

supra note 9 and accompanying text.
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text.
220 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009) (―A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.‖); see also In re
Odman, 687 P.2d 153, 156 (Or. 1984) (per curiam) (disciplining lawyer for incompetent
handling of estate).
221 See LUBAN, supra note 15, at 155 (suggesting that there are no cases of discipline on
attorneys for violating Rule 2.1 because clients are more interested in malpractice damages than
in pursuing ethical grievances); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 52 (2000) (treating incompetent representation principally as a breach of duty of
care); 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 30, § 19.1 (discussing competency and its relation to
duty of care).
222 See supra notes 76–85.
218 See
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C. Attorney Discipline
If Model Rule 2.1 is designed to protect society and third parties
against client harm through the exercise of lawyer independence, our
next question is how the disciplinary system can protect either interest
under the Rule. Consider two scenarios. First, suppose that a client‘s
criminal or fraudulent transaction harms a third party. Prior to acting,
the client sought the advice of counsel. Let us assume that the
attorney had no knowledge of the fraud but failed to exercise
independent professional judgment in advising the client that the
transaction was wrongful. For our second scenario, assume that the
attorney was not asked about the propriety of the transaction
described above, but furthered it without inquiry despite reasonable
grounds to suspect client wrongdoing.
On either scenario, the harmed third party could file an ethics
complaint against counsel for breach of Rule 2.1. If these complaints
have not been filed thus far, it is likely because few have understood
the third-party-protection rationale of the Rule, and ethics committees
and courts have not explored the implications of the third-partyprotection purpose of the Rule to determine when the Rule applies or
what it requires of counsel, the subjects of Parts III and IV above.
Given that Rule 2.1 is designed to protect third parties, it follows that
disciplinary authorities should recognize the grievance of a third party
who was harmed by its breach.223
Parts III and IV have offered an analysis of when Rule 2.1 applies
and what it requires of counsel. These standards should be applied by
a disciplinary tribunal in assessing an alleged violation of the Rule. In
the each of the scenarios described above, under our proposed
construction of Rule 2.1, counsel is required to exercise independent
professional judgment. The requirements of the Rule are triggered not
only when counsel provides advice, but also when she has reason to
suspect wrongdoing in a transaction that she is furthering.224
The next question posed by these scenarios is how a disciplinary
tribunal can determine whether counsel has exercised the independent
professional judgment required by the Rule. Professional judgment,
223 Some states generally allow any person to file a disciplinary grievance against an
attorney, regardless of their personal stake in the case. E.g., N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37A(II)(a)(2)(A)–
(B), available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-37a.htm (―Any person may file a
grievance with the attorney discipline office to call to its attention the conduct of an attorney
that he or she believes constitutes misconduct which should be investigated by the attorney
discipline office.‖). In states that consider the grievances only of those personally affected by
the alleged violation, the grievance of a third party who is harmed by the alleged violation of
Model Rule 2.1 would qualify for consideration.
224 See supra Part IV.B.2.
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we have determined, has both a procedural element—requiring
inquiry to gain sufficient factual and legal information—and a
substantive element—requiring counsel‘s conclusions to be within the
bounded range of professional judgment.225 The first question poses
few substantive concerns; it asks only whether the attorney‘s inquiry
into the facts and law was sufficient to render an informed judgment
in the scenarios described above.226
The more difficult question is how a disciplinary tribunal or court
can evaluate compliance with the independent-professional-judgment
standard when the lawyer has satisfied the procedural requirements of
the Rule, but reached an incorrect conclusion about the propriety of
the proposed conduct or transaction. An incorrect assessment is not
tantamount to a failure to exercise independent professional
judgment. On the other hand, independent professional judgment is
not a subjective exercise for which any answer is acceptable.227
Although law often requires interpretation, there is typically a limit
on the range of legitimate interpretations to any given question. As
noted earlier, the term ―professional‖ constrains the attorney‘s
judgment, and provides the standard by which to evaluate the
judgment of the attorney. The remaining question is whether the
attorney‘s interpretation is within the acceptable boundaries of the
professional community at the time the advice was given.228
Ultimately, a disciplinary proceeding addressing an attorney‘s
failure to exercise independent professional judgment is committed to
the notion that the law is sufficiently objective to evaluate when an
attorney has strayed beyond professional limits in assessing the
propriety of the client‘s conduct. The fact that judgment is at issue is
not reason to deem the question irretrievably subjective. Even a more
basic allegation of wrongdoing under the ethics rules, a grievance
alleging that counsel provided incompetent advice to the client in
violation of Rule 1.1, requires judgment regarding what advice the
lawyer should have provided the client.229 Just as incorrect advice of
counsel is not a stand-alone basis for a finding that the attorney
225 See

supra Part III.C.
supra notes 155–58.
227 See supra notes 178–80.
228 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. States typically refuse to admit expert
testimony on whether the attorney violated an attorney ethics rule in an attorney disciplinary
proceeding. E.g., In re McKechnie, 657 N.W.2d 287, 290 (N.D. 2003) (viewing the expert
testimony as unnecessary to assist the trier of fact). An open question is whether expert
testimony on the interpretive standards of the legal community would fall within this
proscription.
229 See Model Rules of Prof‘l Conduct R. 1.1 (2009) (―A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.‖).
226 See
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advice was incompetent,230 disagreement among counsel or even
disagreement between the attorney‘s advice and a subsequent court
finding, is not sufficient for a finding that an attorney breached Rule
2.1. Under both rules, however, some advice is objectively beyond
the acceptable range of under the circumstances.
D. Attorney Liability
Unlike a disciplinary proceeding, a civil claim may result in
financial recompense for the victim of the crime or fraud that lawyer
independence could have prevented. Thus, third parties have an even
greater incentive to seek civil recovery for a failure of lawyer
independence. The question, however, is whether attorneys can be
held liable to third parties who are harmed by the lawyer‘s failure to
exercise independence that could have prevented the wrongdoing. In
this Section, we will explore whether third parties have a claim for
such failing, how the claim relates to Rule 2.1, and how a failure of
lawyer independence can be evidenced in such a claim.
Whether and when an attorney owes a duty of care to a third party
are questions that have generated substantial disagreement among the
states.231 Courts have adopted a variety of different approaches.232
Some have denied such claims altogether based on an absence of
privity.233 Others allow claims under third-party-beneficiary law234 or
the invitation-to-rely standard of the Restatement.235 Still others have
230 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 3–5 (noting in connection with the
competency requirement of Model Rule 1.1 that a ―thoughtful opinion on a difficult or unsettled
question is not incompetent even if it later proves to have been wrong‖).
231 Kevin H. Michels, Third-Party Negligence Claims Against Counsel: A Proposed
Unified Liability Standard, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 143, 148 (2009). In order to prevail on a
duty of care claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of
care; (2) the defendant breached such duty; (3) such breach was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff‘s harm; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164–65 (5th ed. 1984). The first of these elements is
the subject of our inquiry here.
232 For a detailed discussion and critical analysis of each of these approaches, see Michels,
supra note 231, at 150–59.
233 See, e.g., Bryant v. Robledo, 938 So. 2d 413, 422 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (holding that
an essential element of a malpractice claim is the existence of an attorney-client relationship);
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 316 (App. Div. 1990) (finding lack
of privity and, therefore, denying claims of investors against law firm that prepared tax opinion
letters). See generally MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 30, § 7.7 (collecting decisions that require
privity).
234 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 cmt. b (1981) (―[T]he parties to a
contract have the power, if they so intend, to create a right in a third person.‖). A leading case
applying this standard to the question of whether an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient is Guy
v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 752–53 (Pa. 1983) (weighing the increased concern over liability
for lawyers with the lack of recourse for nonclients).
235 A lawyer owes a duty to a nonclient if the lawyer or client ―invited‖ the nonclient to
rely on the lawyer‘s opinion or provision of other legal services and the third party is not too
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applied a more expansive approach, such as California‘s balancing
test, which asks whether the balance of factors justifies an extension
of the duty to a third party.236 An insistence on privity would, of
course, eliminate the attorney‘s liability to a nonclient who suffers
harm as a result of the attorney‘s failure to exercise independent
judgment in advising the client or furthering a transaction. Moreover,
a court applying either the third-party-beneficiary or the
Restatement‘s invitation-to-rely standard is not likely to recognize
such a third-party claim because, in most cases, neither attorney nor
client will have intended to benefit the third party or extended an
invitation to such third party to rely on any statement or services
related to the harm.
Under the California balancing approach, however, the courts
consider a variety of factors in determining whether the attorney owes
a duty to a third party, including:
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant‘s conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant‘s
conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm. 237
Although the court originally applied these factors to defendants other
than attorneys, the courts now apply the test to determine whether
attorneys owe a duty to third parties if liability will not ―impose an
undue burden on the profession.‖238
Courts that incline toward the California balancing approach239 or
some version of a negligence standard,240 may extend a duty of care

remote to warrant such protection. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 51(2) (2000).
236 E.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (balancing of various factors to
determine whether a lawyer will be liable to a third person not in privity).
237 Id.
238 Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961).
239 E.g., Goldberger v. Kaplan, Strangis & Kaplan, P.A., 534 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (using a balancing of factors in determining whether an attorney owes a duty to a
third party); Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 534 N.W.2d 734, 627 (Mo. 1995)
(explaining the use of the balancing test as a means of determining ―whether non-client
beneficiaries of a will could maintain a legal malpractice action‖).
240 In an earlier work, I have argued that an ―ethical differentiation‖ standard represents the
better approach to determining when to recognize third-party duties of care: attorneys should
owe duties to third parties when negligence standards would generally recognize such duties
and the attorney ethics rules do not impose a countervailing obligation on counsel. Michels,
supra note 231, at 147.
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from the attorney to a third party who is harmed by an attorney‘s
failure to exercise independent professional judgment in counseling
the client. Consider the earlier example in which an attorney has
reason to suspect that a corporate client‘s transaction is wrongful but
closes the transaction without a deeper inquiry. Although counsel
would not ―know‖ of any wrongdoing, her actions in furthering the
transaction under these circumstances would violate the independentprofessional-judgment standard developed herein. If the transaction
proves to be criminal or fraudulent and a third party commences an
action against the attorney for damages caused by the wrongful
transaction, a court would have to determine whether the attorney
owed a duty of care to the third party.
A number of factors support extension of such duty under the
California balancing standard in this example.241 First, the plaintiff
was party to the transaction that harmed her, so the transaction was
intended to ―affect‖ her. Second, harm to a third party is foreseeable
based on the attorney‘s efforts to consummate a transaction without
inquiring into circumstances that reasonably suggested that the
transaction was criminal or fraudulent.242 The attorney‘s failure to
inquire is ―closely‖ linked with the harm, since the suspected
wrongdoing would, if true, directly harm the third party. There is,
moreover, a troubling moral indifference implicated by an attorney‘s
actions to further a transaction that she reasonably suspects is
criminal or fraudulent. Finally, if we believe that some of the
corporate scandals of recent decades could have been prevented had
counsel not closed transactions while ignoring signs of their wrongful
nature, then for policy reasons alone, courts have ample incentive to
enforce the duty of lawyer independence.
Moreover, the recognition of counsel‘s duty to a third party under
these circumstances would not conflict with any ethical obligation of
the attorney.243 First, Model Rule 2.1 requires the lawyer to exercise
independent professional judgment, and therefore the attorney‘s
ethical obligations are entirely consistent with the duty of care to the
third party. Second, this duty would not undermine the attorney‘s
confidentiality obligation because the attorney is allowed to disclose
client information to ―respond to allegations in any proceeding

241 See

supra notes 236–238.
it is not certain that the transaction would prove wrongful and harm the third
party, given the attorney‘s reasonable suspicion the prospects of such harm are quite high. The
California test requires foreseeability, not certainty. See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19
(Cal. 1958).
243 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
242 While
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concerning the lawyer‘s representation of the client.‖244 Thus, under
the ―balancing‖ test of whether a duty is owed to third parties, a court
has a basis to extend a duty of care to a third party who was harmed
by an attorney‘s failure to exercise independent professional
judgment.245
In addition, when an attorney‘s alleged negligence stems from an
omission or failure to act, as here, professional standards creating a
duty to a third party support the imposition of a duty of care on
counsel.246 In the hypothetical, this Article‘s proposed construction of
Rule 2.1 requires counsel to undertake further inquiry to assess the
propriety of the transaction when there is reason for suspicion of
wrongdoing. Thus, the attorney ethics rules impose a professional
obligation on counsel to take affirmative action that, in turn, can
support imposition of a duty of care to third parties.247
In the example offered above, the attorney‘s failing was
procedural: she neglected to inquire into the suspicious facts and
circumstances before furthering the transaction.248 Suppose, however,
that the failing was substantive—that the attorney gained the requisite
information but concluded that the transaction was not criminal or
244 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2009). The Official Comments to the
Model Rules affirm, moreover, that the right to disclose client information in response to a
claim of lawyer wrongdoing applies in the civil, disciplinary, and criminal setting, and extends
to instances in which the attorney responds to an allegation of wrongdoing by a third party. Id.
R. 1.6 cmt. 10. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers likewise permits a
lawyer to disclose ―otherwise confidential client information‖ in response to an assertion by a
nonclient that the lawyer ―engaged in wrongdoing in the course of representing a client.‖
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. g (2000) (allowing such
disclosure ―despite the fact that the client involved has not waived confidentiality or had any
role in threatening or making the charges‖). In order to preserve the confidentiality of the
client‘s consultation with counsel regarding the propriety of the client‘s proposed conduct, the
attorney‘s advice should not, absent special circumstances, be admissible in a criminal or thirdparty civil action against the client. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text (explaining
why confidentiality is afforded to such discussions).
245 Likewise, the extension of a duty of care to the third party would satisfy the ethicaldifferentiation test that I have proposed elsewhere. See supra notes 231 and 240. The client
would likely also share liability for the wrongdoing, and the attorney‘s liability would therefore
be reduced under comparative liability principles. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 7 (2000) (explaining the basic rules of comparative
liability).
246 E.g., Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (―[T]he
relationship between a psychotherapist and his patient gives rise to an affirmative duty for the
benefit of third persons.‖); Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 820–21 (Tenn. 1997) (―[A] duty
of care may exist where a psychiatrist, in accordance with professional standards, knows or
reasonably should know that a patient poses an unreasonable risk of harm to a foreseeable,
readily identifiable third person.‖).
247 While ethical duties can inform a court‘s extension of duties of care for omissions that
foreseeably harm third parties, they do not provide a cause of action, which remains tort based.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 scope [20] (―Violation of a Rule should not
itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer.‖).
248 See supra notes 162–64.
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fraudulent and thereafter consummated the transaction. The question
on these facts is whether an attorney applying the interpretive
standards and norms of the legal community could have reached that
conclusion.249 The latter question is no more open-ended than the
standards that accompany malpractice claims against counsel
generally. Malpractice asks whether the attorney‘s advice or conduct
was consistent with what an ordinarily skilled lawyer would have
done in the circumstances.250 Both questions therefore require expert
testimony of other professionals to describe the professional standards
accepted by the community and their application to the circumstances
faced by counsel.
E. Relation to Other Standards
We have already discussed the relation of Rule 2.1 to other ethics
rules designed to protect the client. Rule 2.1, properly understood, is
designed to protect third parties and society against client wrongdoing
that lawyer independence could prevent.251 Thus, courts must resist
the temptation to interpret Rule 2.1 as a call for competency and
avoidance of conflicts of interest, each of which is addressed
expressly by other ethics rules.252
Our next question is how our proposed interpretation of Rule 2.1
relates to the ―reporting up‖ rules traditionally invoked when
questions of client fraud arise. Specifically, we will address how Rule
2.1 interacts with Sarbanes-Oxley,253 a federal statute adopted in the
wake of Enron and the other corporate scandals of the 2000s;254 and
Model Rule 1.13, an ethics rule modified in part as a response to these
scandals and in part for consistency with the changes wrought by
Sarbanes-Oxley.255
The most basic requirement of Rule 2.1—that an attorney exercise
independent professional judgment in advising the client—is simply
not addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley or any other ethics rule. As we have
argued in Part II, legal ethics without lawyer independence is
249 See

supra notes 166–79.
Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 593 (Cal. 1975) (looking to the law that was
available to the lawyer at the time he performed legal services for his client).
251 See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 62–76.
253 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
254 See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 2 (2002) (explaining the background and need for
legislation in the wake of corporate scandals).
255 See generally Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The
Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1089 (2006).
250 E.g.,
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essentially agency law tailored to fit the particulars of the legal
setting. If we are to honor the third-party and societal-protection
concerns of lawyer independence, however, agency principles must
give way when lawyer independence is required. In practice, this
means that the client‘s general right to control the scope of the
representation under Rule 1.2(d) is superseded by the independence
demands of Rule 2.1.256 Conversely, if we are not to intrude
unjustifiably on the client‘s right to shape the representation, courts
must establish clear standards for when Rule 2.1 applies and when it
does not.257 In the transactional setting, under our proposed
interpretation of Rule 2.1, the attorney has a special obligation of
further factual inquiry and legal assessment when the client asks her
to assess the propriety of a proposed action or further a transaction
that counsel has reason to suspect is wrongful.258 No other ethics rule
demands this of counsel, which leaves a troubling lacuna if we ignore
the demands of lawyer independence.
The ―reporting up‖ rules likewise address issues distinct from Rule
2.1, properly understood. The regulations promulgated by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission under Sarbanes-Oxley impose
obligations on counsel for a publicly held company who discovers
evidence of the company‘s ―material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation.‖259 Under SarbanesOxley and its regulations, the lawyer is required to report such
wrongdoing to certain company officials or a committee within the
company, and in some instances is permitted to report it beyond the
company.260 Similarly, Model Rule 1.13 requires reporting within the
organization and, in limited circumstances, beyond the organization
when the attorney ―knows‖ of certain types of wrongdoing.261
Sarbanes-Oxley and Model Rule 1.13 are thus designed to
eliminate attorney silence when the attorney is aware of past, present,
or ongoing client wrongdoing. Neither addresses the central concerns
of lawyer independence, however. Rule 2.1, as proposed here, insists
that an attorney: accurately assess the propriety of the client‘s
proposed transaction when asked, and ask questions, learn more, and
accurately assess a transaction that counsel has reason to suspect is
wrongful before providing assistance on such transaction.262 Rule
256 See

supra Part III.D.
supra Part III.C.
258 See supra Part IV.C.
259 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2006).
260 17 C.F.R.§ 205.3(d)(2) (2009).
261 Model Rules OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2009).
262 See supra Part V.B.
257 See
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1.13, by contrast, requires no action of counsel unless the attorney
―knows‖ of client wrongdoing. The attorney‘s obligations under
Sarbanes-Oxley are triggered when counsel ―becomes aware of
evidence of a material violation‖ of the client,263 a standard more
demanding than knowledge but substantially less demanding than the
―reasonable suspicion‖ that triggers further inquiry by the transaction
lawyer under Rule 2.1.264
Although lawyer independence differs in kind from the reportingup rules of Sarbanes-Oxley and Model Rule 1.13, the standards are
complementary.265 Sarbanes-Oxley and Rule 1.13 explain what
counsel should do when she is aware or has knowledge of client
wrongdoing.266 The lawyer-independence standard proposed here
addresses the prior question: when do attorneys have an obligation to
gain such awareness or knowledge?
VI. CONCLUSION
It is easy to see how lawyers might be confused about the positive
law of lawyer independence, which is our shorthand term for the
―independent professional judgment and candor‖ required of counsel
by Rule 2.1. We have identified three assumptions about legal
practice that run against the grain of independence. First, under the
traditional understanding of legal practice, the client is the principal
and the lawyer the agent—an understanding that emphasizes
263 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c); see also id. § 205.2(e) (―Evidence of a material violation
means credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances,
for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material
violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.‖). Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley is implicated
when the attorney becomes ―aware‖ that what has occurred is about to occur is evidently
wrongful, rather than the proposed standard‘s insistence on further inquiry by counsel when the
attorney has reason for concern about the propriety of a proposed transaction, but does not yet
have credible evidence that it is wrongful. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,715, 51,727 n.105 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249)
(―‗Aware‘ is a commonly used and well-defined English word, meaning ‗having knowledge;
conscious; cognizant.‘‖).
264 In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley applies only to attorneys for publicly held companies, 17
C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2009), whereas MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) applies
to attorneys regardless of client type, including public and private corporations.
265 Sarbanes-Oxley does not preempt our proposed interpretation of Model Rule 2.1
because the latter does not affect or diminish any obligation under Sarbanes-Oxley. See
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,320, 6,320 (Feb. 6, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (noting that regulations are ―not intended to limit the ability of
any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attorney not inconsistent with the
application of this part‖).
266 In addition, Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits counsel from assisting a client transaction that
counsel knows is wrongful. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d). Under Model Rule
1.16(a), counsel must withdraw from a client matter that ―will result in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.‖ Id. at R. 1.16(a).
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fulfillment of client objectives as the central task of counsel. On this
agency understanding, the lawyer sees herself as dedicated to
assisting the client without imposing restraints on that representation.
As a second consequence of the agency paradigm, an attorney sees
her duty to provide accurate advice to the client as part of the
lawyer‘s obligation to serve the client competently—not to
differentiate from client goals in service of some other interest. Third,
advocacy casts a long shadow over the legal profession, and there are
valid reasons why lawyers should not limit the client‘s claim to only
those arguments that the attorney, in her independent professional
judgment, deems valid.
In treating advocacy as the defining metaphor for the profession,
however, the third assumption deceives us into assuming that
professional judgment cannot constrain our actions outside the
advocacy role. An underappreciated insight, however, of the 1970
reforms of the attorney ethics rules is that the attorney as counselor
should not be bound by the same ethical standards as her litigation
counterpart. Advocacy is founded on a different rationale, serves
different objectives, and has protections against wrongdoing that
counseling does not. Thus, Rule 2.1 is addressed to the nonadvocacy
roles of counsel.
Although the lawyer-as-agent paradigm captures an important
aspect of lawyering and accounts for much of our vision of the
profession, it does not explain attorney independence. Rule 2.1
provides that in ―representing a client, counsel shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.‖ The
Rule on its face is a departure from general agency principles, which
do not ask that the agent exercise independent judgment. The text,
context, history, and rationale of Model Rule 2.1 suggest that the
attorney‘s independent professional judgment is not simply a
superfluous restatement of the attorney‘s obligations to represent the
client competently, to provide the client with full information to make
informed decisions, and to avoid conflicts of interest. Each of these
requirements is addressed expressly and with greater precision by
other provisions in our Model Rules. Model Rule 2.1 is not an
inelegant reiteration of the agency principles of lawyering; it is an
express departure from them.
Rule 2.1 departs from agency principles because of the unique
societal role of attorneys. When a client seeks advice about the
criminal or civil propriety of his actions, the attorney‘s response often
determines the client‘s behavior. The societal interest in preventing
client wrongdoing warrants a departure from agency norms. Counsel
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must advise clients accurately about the state of the law, without
being swayed by the client‘s interest in a particular outcome. We
afford confidentiality to such discussions—at a considerable cost to
society—to encourage clients to seek legal advice about the propriety
of their proposed actions. Rule 2.1 requires that counsel exercise
independent professional judgment in order to enhance the prospects
that such advice will be accurate. Lawyer independence insists on
accurate legal advice, not to ensure competent representation of the
client, but to prevent the client from engaging in criminal and
fraudulent acts that harm society and third parties.
The client has a general right to control the representation unless
and until an issue arises under Rule 2.1. The Rule is implicated when
in the course of (1) providing advice to the client, or (2) effecting
nonadvocacy ends for the client, including attorney efforts to
structure and effect client transactions, an attorney should have
(3) reason for concern that the client‘s proposed conduct is criminal
or fraudulent. With respect to the third element, the test is an
objective one: when the facts and circumstances present reasonable
grounds for concern or suspicion that the behavior in question might
be wrongful, the attorney‘s obligations attach under Rule 2.1. In such
cases, the lawyer must employ her independent professional judgment
to assess the propriety of the proposed client conduct and report her
conclusions candidly to the client. When the lawyer is required to
exercise independent professional judgment under Rule 2.1, the client
cannot waive compliance with the Rule, although he retains the right
to terminate the representation. Lawyer independence, therefore, does
not abolish the client-autonomy or agency notions that form the
bedrock of modern legal practice. On the contrary, our interpretation
preserves the basic notions of principal control and identifies those
narrowly circumscribed instances when client autonomy must give
way to a larger interest—protection of society and third parties from
criminal or fraudulent conduct.
Because the stakes are so high when questions of wrongful
conduct arise, Rule 2.1 imposes three special conditions—
independence, professional judgment, and candor—on the attorney‘s
assessment of the proposed conduct. Independence requires analysis
uninfluenced by client loyalty, and—despite the pull and tradition of
the agency understanding of legal practice—not a search for ways to
say yes to the client‘s objectives. For cultural, economic, and
psychological reasons, independence can present a real challenge for
counsel.
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Professional judgment has procedural and substantive elements.
First, the attorney must gain the information necessary to form a
judgment about the matter in question, which requires inquiry into the
facts and circumstances as well as research into the law implicated by
the facts. Second, the attorney must exercise professional judgment in
analyzing the facts and law, which consists in developing an
interpretation that is consistent with the standards accepted by the
legal community. The attorney can fail on one or both elements. The
first failing is procedural: a judgment that is factually or legally
uninformed breaches Rule 2.1. The second standard acknowledges
that there may be more than one legitimate interpretation of the legal
authorities that bear on the client‘s proposed conduct. On the other
hand, the standard is committed to the notion that law is objective
enough to deem some interpretations unacceptable because they are
beyond the boundaries of professional judgment. Candor requires that
the attorney accurately report the product of this independent
professional judgment to the client.
Rule 2.1 thus has important implications for transactional lawyers.
Absent a viable understanding of lawyer independence, the principal
constraint in the transactional setting is Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits
counsel from ―knowingly‖ assisting the client in criminal or
fraudulent behavior. The standard allows, and in some cases
encourages, willful blindness on the part of counsel, since
ignorance—even when there is reason for concern about the propriety
of the act in question—allows counsel to avoid gaining the
knowledge that would prevent client assistance under Model Rule
1.2(d). Rule 2.1, on the approach developed here, instead insists that
an attorney accurately assess the propriety of the client‘s proposed
transaction when asked, and ask questions, learn more, and accurately
assess a transaction that counsel has reason to suspect is wrongful
before providing assistance on such transaction. No other rule of
lawyering requires this, and Rule 2.1—once understood as a departure
from agency principles—closes this troubling gap in the law
governing lawyers.
In the transactional setting, the lawyer‘s obligation under Rule 2.1
to inquire into the facts and circumstances is not a general obligation
of inquiry; it is precisely contoured. The lawyer is obligated to inquire
under the Rule only if she has reason for suspicion that the client‘s
proposed transaction is wrongful and the attorney plans to assist the
client in furthering the matter. Moreover, the client is free to refuse
the lawyer‘s efforts to investigate the facts and research the law.
Adequate factual and legal knowledge remains, however, a condition
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of the lawyer‘s services prior to consummating a transaction that she
has reason to suspect is criminal or fraudulent. Thus, while the client
has a right to refuse counsel‘s efforts to learn more, the lawyer who is
denied such access has no choice but to withdraw from the matter,
since to proceed in ignorance would violate Rule 2.1.
The refrain ―Where were the lawyers?‖ asks why lawyers allow
and sometimes further corporate transactions that are wrongful. The
―reporting up‖ provisions of Model Rule 1.13 and Sarbanes-Oxley—
the supposed answers to this rhetorical question—solve the problem
only partially. They require attorney action when the attorney has
knowledge or awareness of wrongful client behavior. The lawyerindependence standard proposed here addresses the critical, prior
question: when do attorneys have an obligation to acquire such
knowledge?
The proposed interpretation of Rule 2.1 presents an opportunity for
states to reform their law on lawyer independence. Nearly every state
has adopted Rule 2.1, although—if the paucity of court attention is
any indication—the Rule has had almost no discernable effect on the
practice of law. If courts and, by extension, the profession continue to
view Rule 2.1 as a client-protection rule (i.e., as another, largely
redundant element of the agency vision of lawyering), then the Rule
will remain dormant. Clients are not likely to complain about their
attorney‘s lack of independence; third parties are. Lawyer
independence does not require adoption of a new ethics rule, or
wholesale revision of ethics principles. Courts can breathe life into
Rule 2.1 by recognizing the Rule‘s real aim—to protect society and
third parties, not clients.
Once we have identified the real constituents served by Rule 2.1, it
is a short step to recognizing their rights under the Rule. Disciplinary
authorities should consider grievances against counsel filed by third
parties harmed by client crime or fraud that could have been
prevented by the lawyer‘s exercise of independent professional
judgment. In addition, the doctrines that extend the duty of care from
attorneys to nonclients enable jurisdictions to recognize third-party
claims for damages. Questions about whether the lawyer has
exercised professional judgment are not irretrievably subjective, and
pose no greater practical challenge to enforcement than the judgment
standards that inform the competency and duty-of-care standards in
the disciplinary and liability settings respectively.
Of course, the greater benefit from changes in the disciplinary and
liability settings lies elsewhere: in the law offices across the country
where lawyers will exercise independent professional judgment when
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required by Rule 2.1. If states are troubled by the corporate scandals
of recent decades and the passivity of lawyers who counseled these
corporations and furthered their transactions, the tools of reform are
well within reach. The states already insist on lawyer independence in
name; it is now time to insist on it in practice.

